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Abstract

Due to the introduction of new technology on the bridge, the navigator’s working
environment and navigational tools have changed. In this dissertation, several safety
issues related to the application of hi-tech equipment have been discussed. In order to
provide an alternative in the event of failure of hi-tech equipment the importance of
traditional navigational skills has been restated.
All SOLAS ships are supposed to have been fitted with AIS by 1 July 2004 in an
accelerated schedule due to the events of “9/11”. With little knowledge of AIS’s
capabilities and limitations on collision avoidance and situation awareness,
navigators have to use AISs to improve safety. This has brought deep safety concerns
related to watch keeping and collision avoidance. Several potential risks of using AIS
have been discussed in the paper.
Currently there are no relevant IMO conventions, regulations, resolutions, and
guidelines that directly stress AIS training. However there are certain provisions in
some instruments that indirectly refer to AIS training. The importance of faithful
interpretation of these provisions has been stated to develop an effective AIS training
syllabus and to organize efficient AIS training both on board and on shore.
The limitation of current AIS training, which is current carried out on board mainly
by self-study with a manufacturer-provided CD, has been examined. Also, on shore
training has been discussed and its limitations are defined. At the end of this paper,
recommendations and an AIS training syllabus are proposed.
Key Words: AIS IBS ECDIS MKD GPS OOW Collision
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Chapter I

Introduction

Chapter I
Introduction
In the Foreword to Third Edition of Training and Assessment on Board, the former
Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization, W.A. O’Neil (2002)
emphasised that:
“At the present time the technology of shipping is changing very rapidly
and it is important that education and training keep pace with the
changes. Traditional skills and experience of today’s seafarers shall pass
on to the next generation, while at the same time they shall be properly
trained to use new technology as it is introduced. This will need to take
place not only through lectures in classrooms and training centers
ashore but also on board ship.”

In light of O’Neil comments, the principle purpose of this dissertation is to examine
how traditional navigational skills should be looked at when new technology is being
introduced on ship bridge, how Automatic Identification System (AIS) training
should be organized and what should be included in AIS training syllabus.
1.1 Importance of the Study
Integrated Bridge System (IBS) on modern ship bridge has gradually replaced
previously isolated installed electronic equipment on traditional ship bridge.
Consequently, working environment and navigational tools have changed. It is
necessary to examine certain impacts of application of high-tech equipment on ship
safety, especially on collision avoidance and situation awareness.

1

Chapter I

Introduction

Recently AIS has been frequently targeted for safety concerns. AIS has been
developed as an information providing system to help identify ships and assist in
tracking targets, as well as enhance situation awareness. The events of “9/11” has
made the original IMO AIS carriage-fitting timetable considerably short. On 1st July
2004, all SOLAS ships have been equipped with AISs. The accelerated AIS
installation schedule has left AIS training far behind. Without properly understanding
the limitations and capabilities, the navigators are expected to use the AIS for safety
of navigation & ship identification. From shore training point of view, not only does
competent training mean that trainees should be trained for the basic operation of
AIS, but they also need to fully understand AIS’s pros and cons. Therefore, it is
necessary to examine AIS’s capabilities and limitations for collision avoidance and
situation awareness. Meanwhile, technical contents itself is not enough to develop an
effective AIS training syllabus. Without proper guidance of relevant regulations, the
AIS training syllabuses can be substantially different form one training center to
another. Therefore it is difficult to assess the competency of trainees. This might be
also true for on board training of AIS.
On the other hand, technology is changing faster than the development of relevant
regulations. There is not a single legal instrument that directly stress AIS training.
However there are some legal instruments that indirectly reflect AIS training. The
fact is that using AIS to assist in collision avoidance and situation awareness will
affect the implementation of certain provisions in COLREGs, especially when AIS
has been integrated with Radar/ARPA, ECDIS. Certain technical provisions in
STCW code have been involved too. AIS application also interacts with VTS traffic
control and information exchange, coastal management, as well as even further for
anti-terrorism measures. Therefore, it is essential to examine which fundamental
requirements of AIS application are implicated in relevant conventions as well as
other legal instruments. Those requirements will guide how AIS should be operated,
and furthermore, to instruct how AIS training should be organized and what contents
should be included in an AIS training syllabus.
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Finally, the study will be used as a reference to develop an AIS training program in
the author’s organization, Dalian Maritime University. The trainees will be existing
deck officers and seafaring students in that University.
1.2 Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this dissertation are as follows:
(1)

To examine challenges of new technology on a ship’s bridge;

(2)

To define current safety issues triggered by AIS;

(3)

To discus advantages and limitations of using AIS on board ships;

(4)

To define limitations of current AIS training;

(5)

To identify how AIS training should be organized;

(6)

To develop an effective AIS training syllabus.

1.3 Order of Presentation
The order of presentation is arranged in a logical sequence to focus and attain the
desired objectives of this dissertation. In Chapter II, challenges resulting from new
technology on bridge will be discussed. IBS can provide a navigator for quick and
accurate information, however it induces the navigator to be over-reliant on IBS. In
addition, working with IBS may result in the navigator loosing the traditional
navigational skill and the “feel” of situations around the ship. Furthermore,
information flow chart may be changed unconsciously. As a member of IBS, not
only has AIS all the above features but it also has its unique challenges to the
navigator.

By 1 July 2004, all SOLAS ships have to be fitted with AIS. The safety issues are of
much concern. Chapter III will examine several AIS triggered safety issues. This
chapter will focus on carriage requirements of AIS by relevant regulations; types of
AIS; non-AIS ships; connecting problems of AIS; AIS impacts on detection of
collision Risks; AIS training issues; integrations of AIS with IBS.
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To know well about the advantages and limitations of using AIS on board is key to
developing an effective AIS training syllabus. In Chapter IV, the advantages and
limitations of AIS will be discussed. This chapter mainly deals with AIS merits in
managing collision avoidance and deficiencies related to safety. Several risks related
to using AIS in collision avoidance will be examined and evaluated, such as issue of
COLREGs violation by vessels during collision avoidance manoeuvres; risk to small
boats; Inaccuracy of AIS information; risk by poorly located AIS display units;
switching off AIS.

Analysis of Limitations of current AIS training, both on-board and on-shore, will
provide a basis to improve the competency of AIS training. Chapter V focuses on the
drawbacks of AIS training. Existing legal instruments will be examined to find
implicated requirements of AIS training. Certain provisions of SOLAS, COLREGs,
STCW and IMO resolutions are carefully studied. Meanwhile, current situation of
AIS installation on bridge is discussed as guidance for training objectives. Current
situations of AIS training both on board and on shore are examined to find their
limitations. The study provides a road map to improve effectiveness of existing AIS
training.

The issues of how an effective AIS training could be organized is discussed in
Chapter VI. Experience of GMDSS training is used as a reference to propose a wellorganized AIS training. Training for using both MKD AIS and integrated AIS is
proposed. Key elements of what should comprise the in an effective syllabus are
listed. Certain issues of on board ASI training are also discussed.

In the final chapter, based on the study of this dissertation, several safety issues
related to new technology, especially to AIS, have been included. These conclusions
can be referred to develop a company safety policy, on board AIS training
procedures and activities, safety culture establishment. Meanwhile, several
recommendations have been given with regard to how both on shore and on board
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AIS training should be organized. An AIS training syllabus has been proposed for
training centers to refer to develop individual training programs.

1.4 Scope and methodology
Contact was made with a few AIS technical experts who have provided important
technical materials to contribute the study. A literature search was extensively
undertaken to examine what findings have been got by current AIS trails and other
research. Some visiting and resident experts in the field at the World Maritime
University were interviewed to seek their opinion and advice.

IMO relevant

resolutions, AIS trail reports and AIS related papers, as well as some AIS-related
proposals submitted by IMO Party States during IMO Subcommittees’ meetings
were collected and examined to support the study. The author also used his personal
experience as a deck officer and as a GMDSS training officer. This experience
helped to identify main issues relevant to the objectives of the research.

During the field trip to Germany, the author has been on board two Ro-Ro ferries and
interviewed duty officers for seeking their opinion and perspectives on AIS
application. The author also has got an opportunity to view how AIS works on board.
This experience has greatly benefited this study.

In order to achieve the goals of this paper, the author has examined 4 high-tech
assisted marine accidents and air clash disasters. Meanwhile potential risks caused by
the introduction of new technologies on bridge have been discussed. Therefore the
study will contribute to find out why traditional navigational skills are important to
be used as back-up measures to ensure the safety in event of failure of positioning
equipment in IBS, such as GPS, AIS etc.
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Chapter II

Recent Technological Challenges on a Ship’s Bridge
2.1 Introduction

On the bridge of modern ships technological change can be found everywhere. Two
decades ago, isolated installed electronic equipment was the featured layout of the
traditional bridge. Today, post-isolated installed electronic equipment has been integrated
into an E-Shaped IBS. With IBS, navigators are more inclined to interpret the
information shown on a screen for decision making and less by visual observation
themselves; navigators having got benefited from this. However, there are some
potential risks with IBS; the latest technology-AIS has been introduced on the bridge
and the carriage of an AIS for all SOLAS ships has became mandatory. Using AIS
effectively is another challenge.

2.2 Changes of Technology on Bridge

An IBS consists of an integrated navigation system (INS), integrated control system
(ICS), individual steering and propulsion controls, machinery monitoring, fire
detection, cargo control etc. Engineers intend to separate IBS into two parts, i.e. INS,
which is used by a navigator for navigating and conning the vessel, and a technical
management system, which can be considered as a totally separate system.
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According to the IEC, IBS is:
Any combination of systems that are interconnected in order to allow
centralized access to sensor information or command /control from
workstations to perform two or more of the following operations: passage
execution; communications; machinery control; loading, discharging and
cargo control; safety and security. Management operation may also be
performed within the IBS. (Fairplay Solutions, 1999, p.25)

In contrast, Mr. Alastair Messer, a surveyor in LR’s control engineering department,
defines INS as a combination of systems that are interconnected to increase safe and
efficient operation navigation by suitably qualified personnel and would typically
include GPS, radar, chart, etc. He further summarizes that INS is specific, whereas
IBS is generic (Fairplay Solutions, 1999, p.25). STN ATLAS (2004) includes a
diagram to show the relationship between INS and IBS. See Appendix V.

New technology applied in IBS has vastly improved situational awareness for bridge
decision-makers simply because of accelerated information processing and superior
displays (Luniewski, 1999, p.41). Over the past several decades, a navigator has been
busy in fixing ship’s positions mainly by GPS and Radar observations, especially
during sailing in narrow waters, heavy-density traffic zones and shallow water areas
etc. Today, ships have become bigger and faster. The faster the ship the more
nervous a navigator may become, simply because it sails further than a slower one in
the same period of time. For example, a traditional ship, which has a speed of 15
knots, can only make 1.25 nautical miles in 5 minutes, while a container ship with a
speed of 25 knots can sail 2 nautical miles in 5 minutes. Some captains require
navigators to present a ship’s position in shorter intervals than 5 minutes. One can
imagine how heavy the workload is for the navigator. Fortunately, the situation is
different on today’s bridge, on which IBS releases a heavy workload in certain
aspects. With IBS, a junior officer can only stand in front of a screen on which
information from different sources can be shown in one.
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Luniewski (1999, p.42) explains that this is a revolutionary shift from the days of
manoeuvring on board, grease pencil CPAs and three-minute fixes. Information
presentation on the modern bridge allows navigators to execute, at a glance, the data
collection and collation functions.

The Electronic Nautical Chart (ENC) can provide a navigator an accurate visual
position. He/she can “see” where ships are and where ships are going as well as
where ships will sail in 3 or 5 minutes. The track on ENC presents a navigator with
visual routes that the ships have followed at an earlier stage. Therefore there is a
dynamic presentation of a ship’s track and a navigator can easily find out if the ship
is sailing according to the passage plan. Hence, a navigator is released from the
heavy task of paper chart working, not only position fixing but also passage
preparation.

The fixes shown on the ENC can be accurate within a few meters and is updated
every 15 seconds. Real-time position presentation on ENC with frequent position
updates allows a navigator to be well aware of his/her surroundings. In addition, the
ENC can show an electronic "voyage plan" which provides navigators with turn
recommendations, compensating course recommendations to correct for set and drift
and other elements. One can conclude that these features will greatly ease the burden
of a navigator and minimize human error.

Luniwwski (1999, p.44) adds:
Compared with paper charts, which are considered the most labourintensive task, ECDIS automated chart management capabilities will
achieve large savings in man power and increased safety. On-line
correction or CD correction will greatly ease heavy burden of officers to
correct paper charts from printed and broadcast Notices to Mariners.
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2.3 Disadvantages of IBS
“It is on men that safety at sea depends and they cannot make a greater
mistake than to suppose that machines can do all their work for them”
(Justice Cairns, in the English Admiralty Court, 1967)

2.3.1 Risks of Over-reliance on IBS
IBS processes data much quicker and provides information more accurately than
the old systems. Therefore a navigator may become over-reliant on the system and
gradually lose the capability to detect any false information when the system goes
wrong. The system can provide navigators with what they want to support decision
making in a much quicker and more accurate way. Therefore, they are going to
trust the system and become more and more dependent on it. In other words, they
just simply trust what the system provides. However, when suddenly something
goes wrong, it is very difficult for navigators to quickly recognize what has gone
wrong, or if they know what has gone wrong, they do not exactly know why it has
gone wrong, because what they see day-by-day is the result of computer processed
data, and they are not involved in the process to work out the result. Therefore they
lack the ability to track the problem from the result back to the process and, in turn
to the origin of problem.

The report of the investigation of the TRANSIT Flight 238 accident shows that the
parameters shown in the meters on the information board indicate something wrong
in the fuel tanks, but the parameters can not lead pilot to recognize there was a leak
of oil. In other words, a pilot could not imagine there was a leak of fuel oil by
interpreting the parameters in the meters of the fuel oil tanks (Discovery Channel,
25th April 2004).

Although there is more time for a navigator on board ship to interpret problemrelated parameters than on board an airplane, less practice makes the navigator lose
the ability to anticipate problems and interpret problem-related parameters.
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The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released a report of the
investigation into the ROYAL MAJESTY’s grounding, which occurred in 1995.
The report shows that a navigator was of over-reliance on the automated features of
the IBS, and had insufficient training in the technical capabilities and limitations of
the system. He also had poor practice in watch keeping with new technologies.
Some specific factors that contributed to the accident are: the echo sounder alarm
had been set to zero depth; the navigator had inefficient monitoring of the status of
the GPS and had no cross-checking of the GPS derived positions (NTSB, 2004).

Cross-checking of the GPS derived positions with other positioning instruments
needs to be emphasized. A navigator should be aware that over-reliance on the new
technology is a risk.

Additional training is needed to make navigators adapt to the use of new
technology and to know new technology’s capabilities and limitations. To interpret
information and use this to increase safety is important.

2.3.2 Loss of Traditional Navigational Skills
Traditional navigational skills (TNS) have been developed over centuries. These
skills are condensed professional skills that have been passed down from
predecessors and they are definitely important in sailing a ship safely at that time.
The young generation today faces both traditional navigational skills and modern
technology-based computerization. There is a choice that either people use only
new technology or both. Currently it is easy to say that seafarers need both because
they still have the opportunity to work on traditional ships. In the future, will
people still need traditional navigational skills? There should be more research into
this issue. Young cadets will argue that what they learn in school is not useful on
board because the skills are out of date and not adapted to IBS. Furthermore,
computers can manage many of those tasks. Therefore cadets may think it is a

10

Chapter II

Recent Technological Challenges on a Ship’s Bridge

waste of their time to learn such old skills that will never be used and the training
syllabus should be changed to reflect the needs of the new technology.

However, most important is to be aware that the system is not designed to manage
everything. What the system does is to calculate, monitor, control, such as ETA,
passage plan, cargo operation etc. It is designed to help a navigator but not to replace
him/her. In other words, the system is a tool, an aid, but not a new brain. Being
aware of this is important for safety. A Captain should be aware that navigators,
rather than systems, must carry out necessary functions.

Navigators have known that just before the year 2000, the Y2K problem was a hot
issue. Scientists had anticipated it might cause a lot of problems to computer
systems on board ships. Navigators were taking celestial fixes to prepare for the
sudden failure of GPS. Since then, navigators have become to realize that
traditional navigational skills are still useful. Today, these skills should be used to
do crosschecking. Therefore, in the case of a GPS failure, navigators should still be
able to make a celestial fix. In addition, the Loran-C system, which is a backup
system of GPS, can be used to fix a ship positions in the event of a GPS failure.
Therefore, traditional navigational skills (TNS) should be passed on to the younger
generation. The more TNS they have, the stronger ability they will have to handle
technical problems and anticipate system failures.

2.3.3 Lost “Feel” for Situations
A navigator can easily lose the “feel” of a situation when working with IBS. The
traditional duties of a navigator make him or her know the ship’s positions well.
Every 30-minute GPS or Radar fix on the chart makes the navigator aware of the
surroundings. Therefore the navigator will instinctively check if the ship is keeping
to the plan. No doubt, this procedure will benefit safety. Furthermore, during this
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well accepted process, a navigator’s capability of controlling, monitoring, and
observing has been maintained and even more built up step-by-step. However,
computers can do what the navigator was supposed to do before. An accurate GPS
position is shown on an electronic chart every 6 minutes, including various vectors
or data related to a ships' maneuvering. Even better, overhead presentations with
large figures show all the information necessary for decision making. Meanwhile, a
Captain does not have to ask a junior officer for information. The Captain simply
glances at the screen and knows what information they want to get. Then, they do
what is needed with a little push or pull. Finally the ship drives itself according to
the Captain’s orders.

gardnews (1999, p.11) identified that bridge automation takes the responsibility
away from the individual and this can lead to boredom, daydreaming, monotony
and a lack of stimulation. There is no need for celestial fixing and no need for 30minute GPS positioning on charts. This feature contributes less busy times,
especially when vessels are in the deep sea. Not being able to converse with a
fellow human being for a long time might make officers less sensitive to certain
surroundings and it is easy for the mind to wander.

2.4 The Introduction of AIS into the Ship’s Bridge
IALA has presented the first proposal of AIS to IMO. The initiative of IALA to
develop AIS is to identify Radar targets within the VTS coverage, since VTS
operators have problems in identifying Radar targets. However, the potential of AIS
to benefit ship maneuvering has been quickly recognized and AIS has begun to be
introduced on ships.

AIS is a ship and shore based broadcast system, operating in the VHF maritime band.
It will provide a series of other ship’s information for navigators, i.e. ship’s name,
call sign, bearing and distance, size and draft of ships, port of destination, the change
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in a ship’s heading, course/speed over ground, rate of turn, etc. Some of this
information is important to ship safety.

According to IMO Resolution A.917(22), AIS has been introduced to help identify
ships; assist in target tracking; simplify information exchange; and provide additional
information to assist situation awareness (IMO, 2002b). Appendix I shows an
overview of the AIS system and its components.

The original IMO timetable requires all SOLAS ships to be fitted with AIS no later
than 2008. However, the events of “9/11” have forced the timetable to shrink. In fact,
all SOLAS ships have to be fitted with AIS by 1 July 2004. Whether being accepted
or not, AIS has been a member of IBS (Refer to Appendix V). Some AISs are standalone units, while others are integrated with Radar/ARPA or ECDIS etc. However
not many are so. gardnews (2002, p.11) argues that ship operators installed AISs on
their ships with the minimum cost to meet the minimum carriage requirements
without understanding their benefits and limitations and without paying much
attention to navigator training in using AIS properly. With a little or no training,
navigators have to use AIS to serve safety as well as security. AIS experts have
recognized its potential for safety. However, they are still working hard to discover
AIS’s limitations. Poorly trained OOWs would make AIS potential compromised and
might contribute to AIS-assisted accidents. Thus, some safety-related issues resulting
from AIS have been debated recently.

Summary: Navigators have benefited from IBS, however its risks to safety have
come out simultaneously without being well known. The newcomer, AIS, is
supposed to contribute more to safety, but without being well understood by the
navigators, AIS could make IBS’s risks much higher to safety than before. Therefore,
it is essential to study AIS’s capabilities and limitations, especially on collision
avoidance and situation awareness. Officers who have to use AIS should be well
trained in its use.
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Chapter III

AIS Triggered Safety Issues
“…Until now we have been very busy in getting technology under control.”
(Patrick O’Ferrall, Chairman of LIoyd’s Register, 1996)

3.1 Introduction

Due to the accelerated process of AIS installation on all SOLAS ships, manufactures
have not been left much time to develop their AIS products. They have been pushed
hard to meet the minimum requirements to catch the surge in AIS installation within
the shipping industry. A series of trials with objectives to evaluate AIS’s value as a
navigation aid have been carried out over the past few years and experts are still
working on further trials and the evaluation of the results. Navigators have
appreciated the benefits of AIS to safety but at the same time, the AIS experts and
users find that there are several inherent deficiencies and technical problems that
have been left unsolved.

Several problems are highlighted, such as the non-integration between AIS and other
electric equipment of IBS; risks to non-AIS small ships; the poor location of the AIS
display unit on the bridge; wrong and uncoordinated message transfer; interference
among Radar, AIS, GPS etc.
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3.2 Carriage Requirements of AIS

To be aware of what ships have been fitted with AIS is a pre-condition in examining
the limitations of AIS and its effect on safety. In addition, some ships have been
fitted with Class A AIS, while others are about to be fitted with Class B AIS. Both
Classes of AIS have effects on safety. According to SOLAS Chapter V Regulation
19, the carriage requirements of AIS are mandatory for certain types of ships.
Meanwhile, the U.S. carriage requirements of AIS laid down in the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) extend to the effects on self-propelled
vessels of 20 meters or more in length. Furthermore, some standards and guidelines
of AIS adopted by IMO describe how AIS should perform, how it should be operated
and where it should be fitted.

3.2.1 AIS carriage requirements of SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19
According to Regulation 19, all ships of 300 GRT or upwards would have been fitted
with AIS by 1 July 2004. The details in Regulation 19 are as follows:

2.4.2.4 in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of
300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage,
not later than the first safety equipment survey after 1 July 2004 or by
31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier. (IMO, 2002a)

Warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or operated by governments are
not required to be fitted with AIS (IMO, 2002a). The majority of leisure craft and
fishing vessels are unlikely to be fitted with AIS for many years to come, if ever.
Also, objects, such as containers lost overboard, other flotsam and ice obviously will
not be fitted with AIS (Stitt, 2004). Off-shore platforms and navigation aids are also
not required to be fitted with AIS according to SOLAS.
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3.2.2 U.S. Carriage Requirements of AIS
The MTSA (2002) delineates the U.S. AIS carriage requirements. The requirements
are nearly identical to SOLAS. The special requirements are as follows:

§ 164.46 Automatic Identification System (AIS)
(a.1) Self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in length, other than
passenger and fishing vessels, in commercial service and on an
international voyage, not later than December 31, 2004. (USCG, 2004)

3.2.3 AIS Standards and Guidelines
Currently, there are several standards and guidelines to affect the performance of
AIS.
(1) IMO Resolution MSC.74 (69), Annex 3, i.e. Recommendation on
Performance Standards for a Universal Ship borne Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS).
(2) ITU-R Recommendation M.1371-1, i.e. Technical Characteristics for a
Universal Ship borne Automatic Identification System Using Time Division
Multiple Access in the Maritime Mobile Band.
(3) IEC 61993-2 Ed.1, Maritime navigation and radio communication
requirements - Automatic identification systems (AIS) - Part 2: Class A ship
borne equipment of the universal automatic identification system (AIS) Operational and performance requirements, methods of test and required test
results
(4) IMO Resolution A.917 (22), i.e. Guidelines for the onboard operational use
of shipborne automatic identification system (AIS).
(5) IMO SN/Circ. 227, Guidelines for the installation of a shipborne automatic
identification system (AIS).
(6) IALA Recommendation on AIS Shore Stations and Networking Aspects
Relating to the AIS Service, Edition 1.0, September 5, 2002.
(USCG, 2004)
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3.2.4 Types of Automatic Identification Systems
There are two types of AIS, i.e. Class A and Class B.
(1) Class A is the ship-borne mobile equipment intended for vessels meeting
IMO AIS carriage requirements.
(2) Class B is the ship borne mobile equipment, which provides facilities not
necessarily in accordance with IMO AIS carriage requirements. IEC has
begun work on a Class B certification standard, which should be completed
by 2004 - 2005. The Class B is nearly identical to the Class A, but with the
following exceptions:
•

Has a reporting rate less than a Class A (e.g. every 30 sec. when
under 14 knots, as opposed to every 10 sec. for Class A);

•

Does not transmit the vessel’s IMO number or call sign;

•

Does not transmit ETA or destination;

•

Does not transmit navigational status;

•

Is only required to receive, not transmit, text safety messages;

•

Is only required to receive, not transmit, application identifiers;

•

Does not transmit rate of turn information

•

Does not transmit maximum present static draught
(USCG, 2004)

3.3 AIS Information

The IMO Resolution A.917 (22) states that the purpose of AIS is to help identify
vessels; assist in target tracking; simplify information exchange (e.g. reduce verbal
mandatory ship reporting); and provide additional information to assist situation
awareness. The on-board AIS broadcasts a series of standardised information to
achieve the purpose.
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3.3.1 The Information Provided by AIS
According to IMO Resolution MSC 74(69), the information provided by AIS should
include the following.
(1)

I.D.: MMSI number (Maritime Mobile Service Identify)

(2)

Static:
•

IMO number (where available)

•

Call sign & name

•

Length and beam

•

Type of ship

•

Location of position-fixing antenna on the ship (aft of bow and port
or starboard of centerline)

(3)

(3)

(4)

Dynamic:
•

Ship's position with accuracy indication and integrity status

•

Time in UTC

•

Course over ground

•

Speed over ground

•

Heading

•

Navigational status (e.g. NUC, at anchor, etc. - manual input)

•

Rate of turn (where available)

•

Optional - Angle of heel (where available)

•

Optional - Pitch and roll (where available)

Voyage related:
•

Ship's draught

•

Hazardous cargo (type)

•

Destination and ETA (at Master’s discretion)

•

Optional - Route plan (waypoints)

Short safety-related message
(IMO MSC 74 (69), May 1998)
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In addition, according to IMO Resolution A.917 (22), navigational statuses that are
recommended to use are listed as follows1:
(1) Underway by engines
(2) At anchor
(3) Not under command (NUC)
(4) Restricted in ability to maneuver (RIATM)
(5) Moored
(6) Constrained by draught
(7) Aground
(8) Engaged in fishing
(9) Underway by sail
(IMO A.917 (22), 25th January 2002)
3.3.2 AIS Information Update Rates
According to the IMO performance standards (IMO A.917 (22)), the data is
autonomously sent at different update rates:
(1)
(2)

Dynamic information dependent on speed and course alteration (see Table 3-1),
Static and voyage related data every 6 minutes or on request (responds
automatically without user action).
Type of ship

Reporting interval

Ship at anchor

3 min

Ship 0-14 knots

12 sec

Ship 0-14 knots and changing course

4 sec

Ship 14-23 knots

6 sec

Ship 14-23 knots and changing course

2 sec

Ship >23 knots

3 sec

Ship >23 knots and changing course

2 sec

Table 3- 1: Report Rate of Dynamic AIS Information
1

Navigational status information has to be manually entered by an OOW and changed as necessary.
In practice, since all these relate to the COLREGs, any change that is needed could be undertaken at
the same time that the lights or shapes were changed.
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3.4 Display of AIS Information

The AIS provides data that can be presented on the minimum display or on any
suitable display. In the 50th session of IMO NAV 50, a Performance Standards for
Radar Equipment are proposed by Norway. The presentation of AIS on radar is also
included in the standards.

3.4.1 Minimum Display
The minimum Keyboard display, so called MKD, provides not less than three lines
of data consisting of bearing, range and the name of a selected ship. Other data of the
ship can be displayed by horizontal scrolling of data, but scrolling of bearing and
range is not possible. Vertical scrolling will show all the other ships known to the
AIS 1. In Appendix IX of this paper, there is a Figure “AIS-Minimum Keyboard
Display” to show an AIS Display unit with Minimum Keyboard Display (MKD).
Only a ship’s MMSI, names, range and bearing are shown on the screen. If the OOW
wants to identify a Radar target, he/she needs to associate the Radar target with an
AIS target by AIS target’s range and bearing. Sometimes, it is difficult for OOWs to
associate an AIS target with a Radar target. Professor Berking (August 2004) argued
in an AIS-related lecture at World Maritime University in Malmö Sweden that the
MKD of AIS information is worth less to improve the safety of navigation

3.4.2 Graphical Display
AIS information can be shown on a stand-alone graphical display. Where AIS
information is used with a graphical display, the following target types are
recommended for display2:
(1)

Sleeping target-A sleeping target indicates only the presence of a vessel
equipped with AIS in a certain location. No additional information is
presented until activated, thus avoiding information overload.

1
2

IMO A.917 (22), 25th January 2002.
IMO A.917 (22), 25th January 2002.
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Activated target-If the user wants to know more about a vessel’s motion,
he has simply to activate the target (sleeping), so that the display shows
immediately:
•

A vector (speed and course over ground),

•

The heading, and

•

ROT indication (if available) to display actually initiated course
changes.

(3)

Selected target-If the user wants detailed information on a target
(activated or sleeping), he may select it. Then the data received, as well
as the calculated CPA and TCPA values, will be shown in an
alphanumeric window. The special navigation status will also be
indicated in the alphanumeric data field and not together with the target
directly.

(4)

Dangerous target-If an AIS target (activated or not) is calculated to pass
pre-set CPA and TCPA limits, it will be classified and displayed as a
dangerous target and an alarm will be given.

(5)

Lost target-If a signal of any AIS target at a distance of less than a preset
value is not received, a lost target symbol will appear at the latest
position and an alarm will be given.

The stand-alone graphical display of AIS information can present more information
than the MKD, such as a ship’s heading, ROT, COG, SOG etc. Although AIS targets
are presented as symbols and are categorized, one major drawback of the stand-alone
graphical display is that AIS targets are not automatically associated with Radar
targets.

3.4.3 Radar Display
AIS and Radar data association was highlighted in the 50th session of IMO NAV 50.
The proposal of the Performance Standards for Radar Equipment submitted by
Norway states that the most logical display for indication graphically AIS
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information form other ships is the radar display. Radar tracking information can also
be significantly enhanced by incorporating information available form AIS (IMO
NAV 50, April 2004).

In the Performance Standards, AIS target capacity, filtering of AIS sleeping targets,
activation of AIS targets, AIS presentation status, AIS graphical presentation, AIS
target data, operational alarms as well as AIS and radar target association are
mentioned. As long as the proposal is adopted and enters into force, the new radar
equipment should be capable of presenting AIS information and meet the
requirements. In order to avoid the presentation of two target symbols for the same
physical target, the principles of AIS and Radar target association are qualified as
follows:

(1)

If the target data form AIS and radar tracking are both available and if the
association criteria 1 (e.g. position, motion) are fulfilled such that the AIS and
radar information are considered as one physical target, then as a default
condition, the activated AIS target symbol and the alphanumeric AIS target data
should be automatically selected and displayed.

(2)

The user should have the option to change the default condition to the display of
tracked radar targets and should be permitted to select either radar tracking or
AIS alphanumeric data.

(3)

For an associated target, if the AIS and radar information become sufficiently
different, the AIS and radar information should be considered as two distinct
targets and one activated AIS target and one radar-tracked target should be
displayed. No alarm should be raised. (IMO NAV 50, April 2004).

In the Appendix X, there is a Figure “AIS and Radar Data Association” to show how
AIS and Radar data are associated. In this Figure, AIS targets are presented with
1

Simplified Static Association Criteria: Range < 5%; Bearing< 5°; Speed < +/-5 kts; Course < +/-20°.
(Berking, 2004)
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small triangles. Each triangle is associated with a single radar target. The OOW can
easily identify which radar target is associated with which AIS target. By selecting of
any AIS target, the OOW will know the particulars of the radar target.

3.5 Non-AIS Ships

There are some ships that are not required to carry an AIS, such as non-SOLAS
ships, SOLAS ships of less than 300GRT and ships engaged in national voyages,
which are less than 500GRT. Therefore, an AIS cannot detect them. In order to
remind OOWs of being aware of non-AIS ships, cautions are given in IMO
Resolution A.917 (22). They are as follows:

CAUTION
(1) Not all ships carry AIS.
(2) The officer of the watch (OOW) should always be aware that other
ships, in particular leisure craft, fishing boats and warships, and
some coastal shore stations including Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
centres, might not be fitted with AIS.
(3) The OOW should always be aware that AIS fitted on other ships as
a

mandatory

carriage

requirement

might,

under

certain

circumstances, be switched off on the master's professional
judgment.
(IMO, 2002b)

Experts, who attended the trial of the 2002 Test of AIS 1, suggest that regulators and
coastal authorities should require boats that are longer than 20 m to carry AIS, and
1

The AIS Test in British Columbia Summer 2002 is a project where the Bridge Teams of 3 modern
cruise ships evaluated the current implementation of AIS during the summer of 2002 while cruising
British Columbian and S. E. Alaskan waters. Their evaluation resulted in findings and
recommendations aimed at improving its value as a navigation aid. For information, refer to
http://www.uais.org/CruiseShipIIFinalReportV1.2.htm
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the regulators should simplify the technical requirements for class “B” transponders,
so that their component and production costs can be reduced. Furthermore, coastal
authorities should broadcast ARPA targets of ships and boats that are not fitted with
AIS and are longer than 20 m in LOA (UAIS, 2004).

3.6 Connecting Problems with Pre-1995 Versions of GPS

According to IMO Resolution SIN/Cir 227, sensors installed to meet the carriage
requirements of SOLAS Chapter V should be connected to AIS. The sensor
information transmitted by AIS should be the same information being used for
navigation of the ship (IMO, 2003a). Therefore, existing GPSs, as well as other
sensors that have been used for navigation of ships, are recommended to be
connected to AIS. However, because of different versions of communication
protocols, problems with connecting AIS with existing sensors exist.

Pot (2002a) points out that proper installation of AIS on older ships is complicated
by the requirements that AIS broadcasts positions, SOG and COG from the same
GPS being used for navigation, because Pre-1995 versions of GPS use old
communication protocol that AIS does not understand. The same problems exist
when connecting AIS with other sensors. The United Kingdom has submitted a proposal
to review resolution A.917 (22) where it has mentioned similar problems as follows:

To meet the Performance Standards in Resolution MSC. 74(69), AIS
equipment must be interfaced to an external Electronic Position Fixing
System (EPFS - most commonly GPS). However, some older EPFS
that do not meet the latest IMO performance standards in Resolution
MSC. 112(73) are interfaced to AIS. In addition, older EPFS
equipment may not include any significant check on the integrity of
the data being sent to the AIS transmitter. This is also true for other
sensors connected, such as compass, Rate Of Turn (ROT) (where
installed) and speed log. (IMO NAV 50/4/2, April 2004)
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The response to the UK’s proposal is that NAV 50 has decided not to change A.917
yet, but to keep an Eye on AIS problems in practical onboard use. According to
Resolution of A.917 (22), an AIS consists of, among others things, a built in GPS for
timing purposes and position redundancy (IMO, 2002b). See Appendix I. Even
though GPS with new communication protocol can provide ship positions for AIS,
the ship’s positions transmitted by AIS should be the same ones that are derived for
the GPS used for the navigation of the ship.

3.7 AIS Impacts on Detecting of Risks of Collision

Berking & Pettersson (2002) note that there are some concerns on AIS, i.e. AIS
might replace radar; mariners might over-rely on AIS; and COLREGs might be
unduly changed or disobeyed.

3.7.1 AIS does not Replace Radar
The potentials and objectives of AIS both in ship-ship and ship-shore communication
are to:
(1)

Identify vessels;

(2)

Assist in and improve target tracking (near real-time, ground-stabilized,
small risk of target loss);

(3)

Immediately present course alterations of targets;

(4)

Provide additional information to determine risks of collision;

(5)

Provide an overview and improve traffic flow;

(6)

Reduce and simplify (verbal) information exchange.
(Berking & Pettersson, 2002)

The limitations of Radar can be summarised as follows:
(1)

Radar does not allow identification of other targets;

(2)

The display of radar target echoes may be obscured by clutter;

(3)

Radar coverage (range performance) may be limited by rain and snow;
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(4)

Target detection is limited by masking (bends, bridges, other objects);

(5)

The shape of the echo display may appear different from the shape of the
target. Thus, the centre of reflection is different from the centre of the
target;

(6)

The discrimination of targets close to each other is limited;

(7)

For tracking, radar echo based positions and velocities must be
smoothed. Consequently,
• All ARPA data are delayed; in particular;
• Manoeuvre detection is significantly delayed.

(8)

Automatically tracked targets may be lost due to clutter, fast manoeuvres
and target swap.
(Berking & Pettersson, 2002)

It seems that AIS can compensate Radar’s deficiencies, especially in the
identification of targets and instant manoeuvre detection etc. Therefore, it is
reasonable for people to remain in some doubt that AIS would replace Radar in the
near future and become an important tool for safety and a powerful source of
supplementary information available to OOWs for collision avoidance.

However, since not all ships are equipped with AIS, or the AIS might be switched
off at the Master’s discretion, it could not provide an accurate picture of traffic flow
around ones own ship. Berking & Pettersson (2002) emphasise that it is essential to
keep the radar on-board and use it as usual as the most important tool for collision
avoidance. Also, Pettersson (2001) emphasises that navigators should be aware of the
differences between Radar and AIS and of the importance of turning Radar on to
detect non-AIS small ships. Furthermore, people are further worried that with an AIS
display on a Radar/ARPA or ECDIS screen, an OOW might ignore “fine tuning” the
Radar to detect small ships. Finally, IMO Resolution A.917 (22) suggests that:
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AIS is an additional source of navigational information. It does not
replace, but supports, navigational systems such as radar targettracking and VTS; and the user should not rely on AIS as the sole
information system, but should make use of all safety-relevant
information available. (IMO, 2002b)

3.7.2 AIS Impacts on the COLREGs
In an article dealing with how AIS interacts with COLREGs, Still (2004) has
examined several Rules and discussed what kind of effects AIS would have on
COLREGs. He concludes that AIS is nothing more than one of several tools that
should enable navigators to execute their existing obligations under the COLREGs
and AIS does not change directly the requirements of the Rules, although it does
provide an important source of additional information to enhance OOWs’ “situation
awareness”. However, he argues that Rules 6 and 7 may have to be amended to
provide specific guidance on the use of AIS and to recognise the effect of AIS. In
addition, Rule 19 will need to be amended, because AIS will provide another tool to
assist in determining if a risk of collision exists. In particular, Rule 19(d) should
reflect AIS’s potential.

Furthermore, IMO Resolution A.917 (22) suggests that:

The use of AIS does not negate the responsibility of the OOW to
comply at all times with COLREGs. The use of AIS on board ship is
not intended to have any special impact on the composition of the
navigational watch, which should continue to be determined in
accordance with the STCW Convention. (IMO, 2002b)

Berking & Pettersson (2002) emphasise that there may be agreed action
contradictory to COLREGs between ships. Their answer regarding the question
whether COLREGs need to be amended because of the introduction of AIS is no.
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3.7.3 Over-reliance on AIS
Being recognized that AIS can provide more information than needed, and also being
aware that AIS has limitations of its sources of data input, experts worry that OOWs
would tend to be over-reliant on AIS. This issue was highlighted during the IMO
NAV 50th session. Besides the mentioned problems in Section 3.4 of this Chapter,
the proposal further emphasises that:
It is recognized that Problems have been experienced with regard to
setting up AIS installations on board ship to Ensure that the correct
static, dynamic and voyage related information will be transmitted.
There is therefore a concern that over-reliance on AIS information for
navigational safety Should be avoided until steps can be taken to
ensure that all transmitting ships provide the Necessary degree of data
accuracy and integrity for all connected sensors and that the existing
Guidance in Resolution A.917 (22) does not adequately cover these
concerns. (IMO NAV 50/4/2, April 2004)

IMO Resolution A.917 (22) suggests that:

The information given by the AIS may not be a complete picture of
the situation around the ship. The accuracy of AIS information
received is only as good as the accuracy of the AIS information
transmitted. Poorly configured or calibrated ship sensors (position,
speed and heading sensors) might lead to incorrect information being
transmitted. Incorrect information about one ship displayed on the
bridge of another could be dangerously confusing. The user should not
rely on AIS as the sole information system, but should make use of all
safety-relevant information available. (IMO, 2002b)
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3.8 The Issues of AIS Training

Concerns on AIS training will focus on what AIS training should cover and how it
should be taught, what a syllabus should contain, what training standards and
assessment standards for competency should be, and if AIS training should be
mandatory, as well as if the STCW code should be amended to introduce provisions
of AIS training. A Model Course covering AIS training should be developed.

Currently there are no legal instruments to be directly referred to creating an AIS
training syllabus. Winbow (2003) advises that basic AIS training operations at the
level of the minimum installation allowed on board should be addressed. In
particular, fundamental skills, such as setting up the AIS, entry and changing of
voyage data, changing screens and selecting relevant information etc. must be taught.
He further points out besides training for AIS operation, the AIS’s use in conjunction
with Radar and ECDIS should be addressed during the training. However, the extent
to which it should be addressed remains in question. He finally stresses that the use
of AIS information and how to correlate AIS data with that from other sourcesvisual, radar, ECDIS, VHF etc, has to be focused on any training; OOWs should
have the knowledge and skills to be able to select the correct source or sources of
information before making navigation and other decisions.

3.9 The Issues of the Integration of AIS with Radar/ARPA or ECDIS

According to IMO Resolution MSC.74 (69), AIS should be provided with an
interface through which AIS information could be presented on a separate system.
Also, referring to Resolution A. 917(22), AIS consists of, among others, interfaces to
Radar/ARPA, ECDIS/ECS and INS. If the integration of AIS with this equipment
had been achievable, the effectiveness of AIS would be significantly increased.
Furthermore, it can be concluded that a MKD with three lines of data is the minimum
display requirement. The integration of AIS with other equipment is recommended.
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Currently, a three-line MKD of AIS information meets the minimum mandatory
carriage requirements. However, it is not accepted to assist OOWs in decision
making for collision avoidance. In addition a stand-alone MKD AIS has a screen
separated from the Radar/ARPA or ECDIS screen. In the Summary of the 2002 Test
of AIS, team members on one cruise ship commented that it is almost impossible for
OOWs to monitor 2 or 3 separate screens and, worse than that, OOWs need to
associate AIS targets with Radar/ARPA targets. This makes AIS information
distracting rather than a supplementary information source for collision avoidance
and surveillance awareness. The experts suggest that the regulators and competent
authorities are to require SOLAS ships to integrate AIS information on existing
navigation screens (UAIS, 2004).
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It is imperative that shipowners ensure that the gap in the humantechnology

interface

is

bridged

by

providing

competent

comprehensive training in operation and understanding the limitations
of high technology equipment and an awareness of the “distraction”
factors. (gardnews, 166, May/July 2002)

4.1 Introduction

To know well the advantages and limitations of AIS is important to develop a good
training syllabus. From the competency point of view, not only should navigators
know how to operate AIS, but they also should know its advantages and limitations.
Without the proper knowledge of AIS’s limitations, the operation of the system
might lead to AIS-assisted accidents.

4.2 Advantages of AIS

Several advantages of AIS have been identified. Most of them are widely recognized,
such as ship identification using AIS; real-time dynamic display of AIS information;
enlarged coverage of AIS; positive effects on VHF traffic volume; instant detection
of ship’s data and providing more accurate information etc.
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4.2.1 Ship Identification Using AIS
One of the purposes of AIS on board a ship is to help identify vessels. The AIS
information transmitted by a ship is of three different types, e.g. static information,
dynamic information and voyage-related information. First, static information can
show a ship’s particulars. An OOW can anticipate a ship’s maneuvering ability based
on the ship’s length and beam, the type of the ship and the ship’s draught. However,
it is difficult to achieve this by Radar observation. Secondly, the OOW can call other
ships by their names and call signs. It is easy for OOWs to establish communication
between ships. In contrast, it is difficult for OOWs to establish voice contact between
ships by a radar bearing and distance. Thirdly, AIS can provide an OOW with a
ship’s real-time positions and its COG and SOG. However, Radar cannot do these.
Finally, AIS can provide an OOW with a ship’s navigational status; this is another
element that is not available with Radar. The ship heading, the Rate of turn, COG
and SOG can help an OOW predict the ship path in minutes or in an even long period
of time. Radar itself cannot provide a ship’s COG and SOG, the Rate of turn. Radar
can indicate a ship’s heading, but sometimes there is a delay because Radar
determination is based on relative motion. This will be proved later in Chapter IV
Section 4.2.5. In Appendix VIII of this paper, an example of AIS information display
on PC Screen is presented by a Figure. In this Figure, another ship’s particulars are
shown on the right bottom. Thus the OOW on own ship can know another ship’s
name, ID, positions etc. that are important for the safety of navigation. On the left side
of the Figure, a ship path is plotted which is also important for collision avoidance.

4.2.2 Real-time Dynamic Display of AIS Information
In a new version of AIS, many impressive symbols of AIS targets can be presented
on a Radar or ECDIS screen, such as the relative true scale outline of an AIS target.
It is quite easy for navigators to recognize any maneuvers taken by other ships. With
some brands of AIS, real time tracking of a ship’s movements can be shown on the
Radar or ECDIS screen. Therefore, AIS makes navigators quickly recognize the
intention of other ships in the vicinity. Most important is that the vectors of a ship’s
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movements are shown properly, hence navigators can be aware of the intention of the
targets at a quick glance. This will definitely ease a navigator’s mental stress and
workload while passing those critical areas. This feature reduces the possibility of
human error introduced in interpreting radar target data or visual observation.

In an AIS Conference in 2003, Eddle Hadnett, a former P&O deck officer, said that
no less than 26 different large cruise ships in the summer of 2003 were operating
within Alaska’s inside passage. The navigational conditions there are complicated
due to the confined waters with numerous navigational hazards and large tidal
ranges. Under these conditions, AIS is an invaluable tool in assisting the bridge team
to effectively manage collision avoidance, reducing the number of close-quarters
situations to a minimum (Fairplay, November 2003).

4.2.3 Enlarged Coverage of AIS
In AIS, VHF frequencies are used to broadcast messages. Therefore, the coverage of
AIS should be 20-30 nautical miles. Actually, the coverage would be larger than it is
expected. During the author’s survey trip1 on board the ROBIN HOOD, the author
noticed that a few far stations had been identified. For example, the three furthest
ships on 107 nm, 81nm and 69 nm were examined. Of course, those ships are not
relevant to collision avoidance decision-making. Atmospheric ducting results in a
great extension of the VHF reception range. It can be concluded that coverage of AIS
is larger than that of Radar and Visual lookout.

The frequencies broadcast by AIS can propagate far away, further than the human eye
can see visually and the Radar can track. In addition, they can travel over some
geographical obstacles, such as hills or buildings. This feature allows AIS to show
more targets than Radar can track and navigators can see visually. Furthermore, AIS

1

During the field trip to Germany, the author has been on board Ro-Ro ferries, ROBIN HOOD and
NILS HOLGERSSON. This has been the only chance for the author to observe how AIS works on
ships and to interview deck officers about their opinions and perspectives on AIS.
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was found to be especially useful in presenting targets in Radar blind spots or around
bends in rivers etc.
In areas such as dense fog or heavy rain, and narrow waters with complicated
geographical situations, AIS makes “hidden” targets visible when “hidden” targets
are equipped with AIS units. Phil (2004) says that AIS works independently of Radar
and can thus display information about ships around bends in rivers and is not
susceptible to target swap. This capability of AIS will help navigators to detect a
closing vessel early. The navigator can then set a course to avoid interaction.
4.2.4

Effects on VHF Traffic Volume

It is believed that Using AIS properly will reduce the traffic volume between ships
and VTS operators and improve vessel traffic image accuracy.
4.2.4.1 Reducing Traffic Volume Between Ships and VTS Operators
Most VTS organizations in the world present their own regulations to cover certain
types of ships when approaching or entering the VTS areas. They require vessels to
report certain information to VTS centers. For example, when sailing in Singapore
Strait VTS areas, navigators need frequent voice exchange with VTS operators. This
is time-consuming, especially for navigators with bad spoken English. AIS is found
to reduce VHF voice messages and improve safety. The use of AIS would minimise
language problems and reduce the chances of vessels misunderstanding messages
from a VTS centre and vice versa (IALA, 2002),
The Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) of Singapore completed a pilot project in
1999 to evaluate the performance of such a system and the results from the pilot test
indicated that AIS ship transponders could reduce a VTS operator’s time spent on
verbal communications by as much as half (UAIS, 2004).
4.2.4.2 Improved Traffic Image Accuracy
ARPA vessel tracking is sensitive to interference. For example, it is easy to lose
targets, due to the interference of rough seas, heavy rain or snow etc. Sometimes
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track swap takes place, especially when two vessels are close to each other. This is an
inherent deficiency of ARPA track. The proximity of the two close targets makes
ARPA confused, and swapping may occur. The result of swapping is that the
identification of one track is transferred to the other (IALA, 2002). Although AIS
cannot provide a complete picture of the situation around the ship or within VTS
areas, it can definitely improve the quality of traffic image and AIS can effectively
avoid target swapping.
4.2.5

Instant Detections of Ship’s Manoeuvring Intention

The AIS provides other ship’s manoeuvring data in nearly real time, while ARPA
calculates that based on historic Radar data. With the high rate of data updating, AIS
can provide ship’s manoeuvring data much quicker than that of ARPA.
Consequently, the accuracy of target data can be improved and the effectiveness of
action taken can be increased. Berking & Pettersson (2002) indicates the different
presentation between AIS data and ARPA ones’ using an example as follows:
A long tanker starts to turn to starboard. The ship’s heading will then change
to starboard, but initially the stern with its antenna will swing slightly to
port, as the ship is turning around its pivot point (Fig. 4-1). For some time,
the ARPA vector will (at least might) show port. The ARPA radar tracks the
part of the ship which gives the best radar return, normally on a loaded
tanker the superstructure at the stern. A big
tanker, turning and tracked by ARPA radar,
could have turned 40-60°, before this is
detected by the ARPA radar on another ship
or at the VTS, and 3 –5 minutes could have
passed since the turn started. With the AIS
sending

the

heading

from

the

gyro

(maximum +/- 2° error) at intervals down to
2 seconds, this misinformation from the
radar can be eliminated with a significant
improvement in the situational awareness.
Figure 4-1: Potential ARPA “tracking error” or “interpretation error”
(Berking & Pettersson, 2002)
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4.2.6 AIS Provides More Accurate Information Than Radar
In the 50th session of IMO NAV, Norway submitted the Draft Radar Performance
Standards for Ship-borne Radar Equipment in 2004. In this Performance Standards,
the radar system range and bearing accuracy requirements are defined as follows:
(1)

Range: within 30m or 1% of the screen range scale in use, whichever is greater;

(2)

Bearing: within 1°.

Meanwhile, Tracked Target Accuracy is defined as such that measured target range
and bearing should be within 50m (or +/- 1% of target range) and two degrees.

In contrast, IMO MSC adopted the Resolution MSC.112 (73)-The Revised
Performance Standards for Ship-borne GPS Receiver Equipment in December 2000.
In this Performance Standards, Paragraph 3.15 states that when a GPS receiver is
equipped with a differential receiver, performance standards for static and dynamic
accuracies should be 10 m (95%).

In addition, Berking & Pettersson (2002) claims that firstly the ship’s Radar/ARPA can
provide a ship’s position with the accuracy less then 30m. But the accuracy of AIS
ship’s positions is between 1 and 5m. Secondly, the CPA and TCPA determined by
Radar/ARPA are based on the radar distance and bearing. And the accuracy of CPA
determined by ARPA is within 0.5 to 0.7 nm. However, the CPA and TCPA
provided by AIS are based on D/GNSS. See Appendix IV. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the AIS information is more accurate than Radar’s.

4.3 Limitations of AIS

Apart from considerable direct benefits to navigators and shore-based authorities,
there are several safety issues concerned, such as the passing arrangement against
COLREGs; risks to small boats; switching off AIS; the potential for its misuse by
pirates, armed robbers or terrorists etc.
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4.3.1 Passing Arrangement Against COLREGs
The capability of AIS to identify nearby vessel traffic is likely to induce navigators
to make passing arrangements individually. It is much easier to do this than before
the introduction of AIS. Nowadays, both ships that are in a close quarters situation
are identified by name, motion vectors etc. Navigators will tend to contact each other
to make passing arrangements against COLREGs. Before the introduction of AIS,
navigators used to make a call on VHF to attempt to identify each other and find out
if they are the ones at risk of collision. In some cases, a navigator was calling the
other, but the other did not respond, even though he/she knew they had been called.
In fact, most Chinese navigators tend to do this. Sometimes, it is difficult to get
positive identification, even though the conversation is being established. Therefore,
there was always a possibility that the ships that have contacted each other are not
actually the ones talking. Navigators have learnt lessons from collisions that resulted
from this kind of conversation and are aware of that. Naturally they tend just to
comply with COLREGs even if the conversation is established between ships and
kept alert until the risk is over.

With AIS, the barrier of misidentification is minimized. Navigators know well the
ships they want to talk with and they are confident in making private arrangements.
There are no more fears left to make private agreements that may be against
COLREGs. When they do that, it definitely confuses nearby ships, because the
nearby ships will observe unusual behaviour done by the two ships at that moment.
The final report of the 2002 Test of AIS suggests that making private passing
arrangements would be dangerous because other nearby ships, even if they were
equipped with AIS, would not be aware of the specific arrangements (WMC, 2002).
Therefore, navigators should be aware of this and avoid making such arrangements,
especially when they are anti-COLREGs. For the young generation of seafarers,
effective training will make them aware.
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4.3.2 Negative Effects of Poorly Located AIS Display Units on Safety
On board old ships, Radars are installed away from the chart room, in which GPSs
have been fitted and, more often than not, AIS have also sometimes been installed,
near to the GPSs. In these cases, if a navigator wants to get a dangerous target’s
particulars, he/she needs to shift eyes from the Radar to the AIS. It might take a few
minutes to go back to the Radar to keep an eye on the target. This naturally, is not
secure watch keeping and might also discourage the navigator from looking at the
AIS screen. Therefore, AIS will be less beneficial to safety. Figures 4-2 and 4-3
present two examples of poorly located AIS units.

AIS
location

Figure 4-2 Example of A Poorly located AIS Display Unit (1)
(Source: Pratt, 2004)
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AIS Location

AIS Pilot Plug

Figure 4-3 Example of A Poorly Located AIS Display Unit (2)
(Source: Pratt, 2004)

In addition, some old-versions of AIS may only display certain types of text, such as
a list in small black font size to show certain items of ship particulars. In these cases,
how long navigators will spend catching what they want depends on how capable
they are of interpreting the text. That is a limitation of AIS that needs senior officers
to become aware of. During the 2002 Test of AIS, Bridge Teams felt that AIS
information should be shown on Radar and ECDIS screens, since it is unsafe if
navigators are required to shift watch from Radar or ECDIS screens to a separate
AIS screen from time to time. The Teams also felt that it takes too much time to
interpret AIS target information on a separate AIS screen and then associate it with
visually observed target information on RADAR/ARPA or ECDIS screens. The
Teams added that it is too distracting, and in that sense, AIS could be a deterrent
rather than an aid to navigation (WMC, 2002).

Normally, navigators are used to keeping their eyes on the Radar/ARPA screens,
therefore the above-mentioned problems give good excuses for them to give up
watching the separate screen of the AIS. One may argue that ignoring AIS means
cutting a source of watch keeping distraction. This problem will hamper the
execution of potential AIS’s functionality. A solution to this problem could be by
using a modem to transfer the existing AIS message format to be consistent with the
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Radar/ARPA display or ECDIS display. Since both AIS and other electronic sets are
technically different, the barrier is difficult to break and thus the alternative could be
shifting AIS next to one of the other screens. Although this is not a very sound
solution, for the existing AIS on board ships, it could be a cost-effective way to help
AIS to be used correctly.

The final report of the 2002 Test of AIS suggests that manufacturers of ISB should
allow a ship operator to upgrade the software of an existing Bridge System at a
reasonable cost so that it will display AIS information on Radar and ECDIS screens
(WMC, 2002).

4.3.3 Wrong and Uncoordinated Messages Transmitting via AIS
A recent study shows that in many cases wrong messages have been put in AIS and
then sent out. Such wrong messages may be related to the draught of a vessel, a
ship’s callsign, cargo names, as well as destinations etc. Phil (2004) says that many
VTS operators have already reported that between 60 and 80 percent of all AIS
messages contain errors. Some errors come from not updating messages in AIS, and
some others result from incorrect message input. A lack of coordinated and unified
message codes makes certain messages ambiguous.
At the 50th session of IMO sub-committee on safety of navigation, four northwest
European countries, including Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden highlighted
the problem that mariners are using different names for the same destination, when
entering destination data in their AIS units. They identified that numerous variations
in the spelling of the same port makes it difficult for other vessels and shore
authorities to identify the port uniquely. A suggestion to coordinate the message
format of the destination was submitted at this session (IMO NAV 50, April 2004).
A solution to this problem could be the efficient training for using AIS. Training
makes navigators aware of the potential risk to a ship’s safety. Furthermore, training
will make them more responsible for that.
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A Collision Avoidance Policy, which was proposed by USCG in 2003, suggests that
under certain conditions, ships transmitting improper or wrong messages will be
imposed fines detailed here:

AIS enforcement under the proposed policy will allow two warnings
before fines are imposed. An AIS Violation is committed if a ship, that is
required to carry an AIS Device, is either not transmitting the proper
messages or if the content of the messages is erroneous. A VTS operator
who notices an AIS Violation will issue a formal warning. (UAIS, 2003)

4.3.4 Potential Risks to Small Boats
Nowadays, the enclosed bridge is becoming popular on new built ships. The
navigators will have a good working place on those ships and enjoy the watchkeeping. As a result, navigators will at least lose the opportunity to listen for the fog
signals of other ships as they did on older vessels. Moreover, they will lose the touch
of the ambience by feeling, instead acquiring the situations around their ships by
monitoring IBS, especially by Radar/ARPA, ECDIS, AIS etc.

4.3.4.1 Risks to Non-SOLAS Ships
AIS provides far more than navigators want. If lucky, AIS information will be
presented on Radar and ECDIS screens, and then navigators will sit on a comfortable
chair in front of impressive pictures and tend to concentrate on the pictures instead of
looking out of the window. This tendency will impose a great risk on small boats.
Most navigators have the experience that small boats, especially wooden fishing
boats, are difficult to be detected by radar. They are aware and remain alert to that.
While the information of AIS will partially solve this problem if some small boats are
equipped with AIS, there is still a big percentage of small boats that have no AIS is on
board at all. This means AIS cannot help the big ships to detect non-AIS small boats.

The most dangerous point here is that some of the small boats have AIS and some
others do not. Navigators perhaps spend too much time monitoring screens and in
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turn they do less to keep a visual look-out. Therefore, the possibility to find out nonAIS small boats by visual look-out will decrease. This will certainly increase the
collision risk for small boats. Navigators shall be aware that there are a huge number
of non-SOLAS ships sailing around the world, including small boats. The AIS is the
non-mandatory carriage requirement for them. For example, many yachts in
northwest European countries are not fitted with AIS. Meanwhile, some owners of
fishing boats in developing countries cannot afford to fit AIS. Even though some
small boats are fitted with AIS on a voluntary basis, without proper competent
training, crews cannot use it correctly or sometimes the AIS itself does not work
properly.

4.3.4.2 Risks by Overload of AIS Information
On ECDIS screens, only AIS-boats are shown, if the AIS is working properly,
whereas non-AIS boats are not be shown. Therefore if navigators concentrate on an
ECDIS screen, it is easy to ignore non-AIS small boats in the vicinity. While on
Radar screens, apart from the non-AIS boats not being shown, there is another
potential problem, i.e. it is possible for too many symbols of AIS-ships to be shown
around the center of the screens. In turn, the overload of AIS-ships’ symbols will
saturate non-AIS radar targets nearby the own ship, especially in bad weather
conditions. No doubt, there are some non-SOLAS small boats fitted with individual
AIS. Those AIS symbols will be concentrated on the radar screens of big ships. This
would contribute to the saturation of non-AIS radar targets. Without effective
training, it is easy for navigators to ignore the non-AIS boats ahead of them. At the
same time, the crew on board small boats may think that the big ships will give way
to them as usual. However, with AIS, the situation might be different. Navigators will
tend to either ignore non-AIS small boats or discover them too late to take action.
Fortunately, some navigators have already noticed this problem and keep alert when
surrounded by small boats. During the author’s survey trip on board the MV NILS
HOSGERSSON and MV ROBIN HOOD, the OOWs were aware that most of the
yachts sailing in the Baltic Sea are not fitted with AIS.
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4.3.5 Switching off AIS
AIS might, under certain circumstances, be switched off, based on the master’s
professional judgement. According to Regulation 19, Chapter V, SOLAS, all ships
fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where
international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational
information (IMO, 2002). In certain circumstances, AIS should be switched off for
safety or business purposes. However, the effects on safety should be identified and
proper training should be taken for navigators to be aware of this.

Sometimes Captains should switch off the AIS at their discretion. For example, when
sailing in some areas where pirates prevail, such as the Malacca Straits, The Captain
will not want everyone in the vicinity to know what the ship is carrying. At that
moment, it is the Captain’s responsibility to switch off the AIS in order to secure the
ship. Furthermore, navigators shall be aware that some AIS equipped ships do not
turn AIS on for competitive reasons when operating in certain areas. For instance,
fishing boats do not want to make their locations public when fishing.

4.3.6 The Accuracy of AIS Information is Dependent on Other Equipment
In the 50th session of IMO NAV, the United Kingdom submitted a proposal Requirements for the Display and Use of AIS Information on Ship-borne
Navigational Displays in 2004. In this proposal, Paragraph 7 states that:
According to IMO Resolution MSC.74(69)1 and SN/Sirc.217 2, all
ships are required to transmit, if available, position, COG and
SOG(supplied by a GPS to the AIS equipment itself) via AIS.
However, the integrity, reliability and accuracy of the source data con
not necessarily be relied upon. For example, Resolution A.819(19) 3

1
2

3

IMO Resolution MSC.74(69) Performance Standards for AIS.
IMO SN/Circ.217 on the Interim Guidelines for the Presentation and Display of AIS Target
Information.
IMO Resolution A.819(19) on the Performance Standards Applicable for GPS Receivers Installed
before 1 July 2003.
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and associated Test Standard IEC.61108-1 Ed 1 contain no
requirements for:
• The use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM);
• Generation of COG and SOG and output to the digital interface;
• Marking of the validity of any such COG and SOG output; and
• Accuracy of any such COG and SOG output.
Furthermore, there were no requirements and therefore no controls for
the way in which, COG and SOG information may or may not be,
smoothed, filtered or averaged, before being output to the interface.

In addition, Paragraph 8 in this proposal states that:

The accuracy of all received AIS information, including that of
position, COG and SOG, transmitted via AIS should be relied upon
until the integrity of the information is proven.

The accuracy of AIS information depends on the other ship’s equipment. For
example, the GPS provides the AIS with a ship’s position, course and speed over
ground. This means the limitations of GPS will definitely affect the accuracy of the
system’s information. Therefore, cross-checking with other data is necessary before
using the AIS information. Furthermore, the OOW is involved in putting voyage
related and short safety related messages in the AIS, thus human errors might be
experienced. Hence, the reliability of these kinds of AIS information is likely
decrease.

Stitt (2004) argues that:

AIS is linked to GPS as its basis for positioning and for computing
course and speed over the ground. Thus, any GPS errors will be
reflected in the outputs. Information on heading and rates of turn may
be derived from other sensors. None of those sensors can be
monitored by the receiving vessel.
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Whereas Ramsvik (2004) notes in his article:

For the pre 2003 GPSs, course and speed from GPS are not defined at
all; the filters are of great different and the accuracy is unknown. For
the post 2003 GPS, the accuracy is known but the filters are
undefined. Therefore ARPA information and AIS information will not
be the same.

AIS is independent from Radar, therefore the AIS may keep away from the effect of
Radar limitations. However, if AIS information is shown on Radar screens,
conflicting and confusing information may occur that will cause navigational
distraction. On the other hand, if AIS information is presented on a Radar/ARPA
screen, navigators can make a choice, either AIS target symbol or Radar echo/ARPA
track symbol. Navigators should be aware that the two kinds of data might be
different. Stitt (2004) argues that:

Radar/ARPA may be operated in a variety of modes, such as true
motion sets in water-stabilised or ground-stabilised, relative motion.
He mentions none of these will correspond directly with AIS
information. Watchkeeper will need to be able to appreciate the effects
of the differences. Also, AIS information is of ground-stabilised,
while Radar/ARPA information is of sea stabilised. Therefore the
display and the effect on true vectors may be different.

The course and speed over ground is very different from the course and speed
through the water. Therefore for the same target, the information from AIS is
different from that of the Radar, i.e. navigators will get different data for the same
target from the two information sources.

Germany proposes that if the AIS and Radar information are considered as one target,
then as a default condition, the activated AIS target symbol and the alphanumeric AIS
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target should be automatically selected and displayed (IMO, 2004). Berking (2004)
notes that the data have to be “optimised” and the automatic association function has
to check if a set of radar data and a set of AIS data match and belong to the same
physical target. He adds that the “target” association criteria have not yet been finally
developed.

4.3.7 Non-integration Between AIS and ECDIS &Radar/ARPA
Non-integration between AIS & ECDIS, Radar/ARPA is being recognized gradually.
On board MV NILE HOLGERSSON, AIS, Radar/ARPA and ECDIS were produced
by the same manufacturer, i.e. ATLAS. The AIS is integrated with Radar/ARPA,
ECDIS pretty well. Radar/ARPA and ECDIS were installed in a user-friendly way. It
is very convenient for OOW to swift his/her eyes from one to another. Also, AIS
information can be displayed on demand on the Radar/ARPA and ECDIS screens.
While MV ROBIN HOOD was built in 1995 and delivered to serve in 1996, on this
ship, AIS cannot be integrated with Radar/ARPA as they are produced by different
manufacturers, i.e. ALTAS for Radar, NAUTICAST for AIS. The AIS is a standalone unit with its own screen in text display.

So far, many ships have been fitted with old versions of AIS and might only meet the
minimum requirements of AIS information display, i.e. the 3-line MKD. In addition,
earlier AIS products have been designed to stand-alone and integration with other
electronic equipment such as Radar/ARPA, ECDIS etc has not been looked at.
Furthermore, there were technical barriers to achieve the consistency among
electronic units produced by different manufacturers.

IMO has recognised that many AIS have already been fitted without integration with
other electronic equipment. Therefore, certain performance standards that highlight
AIS’s integration were adopted on the basis of guidelines. However, they are nonmandatory. In turn, non-integration will exist for a long time. Many AIS will serve
only to meet the mandatory SOLAS requirements. Whether it can benefit a ship’s
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safety depends on the OOW’s capability to use it properly. For ship owners, they will
be interested in the minimum carriage requirements of AIS, rather than how much
AIS will benefit safety and how efficient their employees can use it.

Human eyes are more sensitive in observing moving or flashing symbols than fixed
black text. No doubt, if AIS information cannot be displayed on Radar/ARPA or
ECDIS, its functionality will be compromised greatly.

In 2002, WMC organized a test of AIS. One of the participating vessels, IAANDAM
had integrated problem between the AIS and the NAVISAILOR ECDIS. The bridge
team suggested that AIS information should be displayed both on radar and ECDIS
with an option to select which information to show. STN-ATLAS has this option but
not all others. On board another ship, VOLENDAM, the bridge team felt that a listing
of AIS targets was not useful in assessing the traffic situation mostly because it was
not integrated with Radar. That means AIS targets do not relate with Radar targets
(WMC, 2002).

The final report of the 2002 Test of AIS also indicated that on ships, integration of
AIS was not achieved (WMC, 2002). Many manufacturers had achieved the
harmonized AIS display on their own products, such as ATLAS, TRANSACT
MARINE, etc. but, so far, integration of the AIS display in different Brands of
electronic equipment has not been realised. Owners of new built ships can buy a
package of products, and then the problem can be solved in the first place. However,
in existing ships, the problems may exist for a long time. Since this problem cannot
be solved in the near future during training programs, such characteristics should be
identified and an approach to improve AIS benefits should be discussed.

In a Collision Avoidance Policy, USCG (2003) proposed that if AIS information was
not displayed on a ship’s Radar or ECDIS screen, it was to be seen as an AIS
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violation and huge fines will be charged if the conditions are not met as detailed
here:
An AIS Violation is committed if an Inspector finds that AIS
information is not displayed on the ships ECS, ECDIS or Radar. Port
State Competent Authorities will log such Violations in the EQUASIS
database for follow-up. The amount of AIS Violation fines will be set
at 0.1 % of a ship's estimated market value for the 3rd violation and
double with each additional violation. (UAIS, 2003)

Different manufacturers apply different information protocol to produce their
products. Therefore technical barriers exist in integrating them. Hence from a
technical point of view, it is not feasible to require all existing ships to meet USCG’s
specific requirements on AIS. The SOLAS convention does not require that. IMO
guidelines related to AIS performance are a sort of soft law and hence there is no
legal support to require all existing ships to meet this requirement.

4.3.8

Negative Effects of Pilot Laptop Display of AIS Data

More and more AIS pilot plugs have been fitted as a package to AIS units (see Fig. 4-3).
AIS information will be displayed on the ENC on the pilot laptop, even if there is a
MKD AIS. If OOWs have been working on a MKD AIS ship, they might not be
comfortable with colourful and flashing AIS symbols presented on ENC. Therefore, this
will discourage team members from intervening a pilot’s decision-making. This is a
potential risk to safety, especially when sailing in heavy traffic areas. The Captain should
be aware of this and take action to increase the information exchange in the bridge team.
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Some owners may be lured by manufactures into buying sophisticated
shipboard equipment by highlighting the additional safety as well as
long-term saving costs without sufficient attention being given to the
training of those who are going to have use the equipment.
(gardnews, 166 May/July 2002)

5.1 Introduction

The implementation of mandatory AIS carriage on board ships has been accelerated
due to the events of “9/11”. There are not enough trials to disclose its potentials and
limitations. In addition, regulations and training standards are not keeping pace with
these hurried steps and the current AIS training proceeds without approved
standards. There are no criteria to evaluate the competency of trainees. Meanwhile,
on board training is not receiving enough attention and, as a result, there is no wellorganized training. Although there are conventions, regulations, a Resolution, Model
courses, and training programs to be referred to develop AIS training programs, none
of them directly stress AIS training. These documents, if faithfully interpreted, can
be considered as a framework for developing AIS training programs.

To develop an effective training program, there are several important issues to be
addressed, such as the faithful interpretation of relevant conventions and regulations;
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understanding the current situation of AIS installation and training and development
of very defined and complete training syllabus etc.

5.2 Requirements related to AIS Training in Conventions and Regulations

Chapter V SOLAS requires mandatory carriage of AIS. Although it does not directly
stress AIS training, it does give fundamental requirements for it. It is well known that
a faithful interpretation will contribute to developing a practical standard and valid
training syllabus. They will all become bases to amend relevent conventions,
especially when introducing AIS training provisions.

Currently, both COLREGS and STCW 95 are not involved in the use of AIS
information and AIS related training. However, certain provisions in these Conventions
do give some references for administrators to develop standards to cover AIS training,
and for training officers to produce an AIS training syllabus. To meet the training needs,
administrators and training centre officers will have to make their own interpretations to
develop standards for AIS training and training syllabi respectively.

5.2.1

AIS Training Requirements in SOLAS Chapter V,

Subparagraph 2.4, Regulation 19 provides guidance on the use of AIS information. It
requires that OOWs should be capable of:
(1)

Providing and updating dynamic messages, such as navigational status, and
other safety-related information, as well as monitoring static messages;

(2)

Monitoring traffic situations and tracking ships;

(3)

Exchanging data with shore-based facilities, if on demand.

It further stresses that OOWs should also know special international agreements, rules,
or standards for the protection of navigational information, such as security-related or
fishery information. Further, AIS operation should comply with IMO Resolution
A.917 (22).

50

Chapter V

Current Status and Limitations of AIS Training

5.2.2 Rules Relating to AIS Training in COLREGs
Both AIS static and dynamic messages are important for situational awareness and
collision avoidance. COLREGs provides regulations to cover both aspects. Training is
an efficient tool to make OOWs capable of using AIS information properly to assist
collision avoidance and to keep surveillance. Therefore as COLREGs is a legal reference
for AIS training, when developing AIS training syllabus, the Rules hereinafter
mentioned should be taken into account.

5.2.2.1 Rule 5 Look-out
The phrase “by all available means appropriate…” laid out in this rule, can be
understood to mean that AIS is included as a navigational aid. Carriage of AIS is
mandatory for SOLAS ships. Hence “proper look-out” should include the use of AIS
for collision avoidance. Meanwhile, AIS information is crucial for OOWs to make a
decision. Therefore, this rule could also be interpreted as to require OOWs to be
capable of using AIS information properly to make collision avoidance decisions.
Stitt (2004) emphasises that it is widely recognised that Rule 5 involves maintaining
good ”situational awareness” and reacting properly to the relevant facts and
circumstances. AIS will make OOWs well aware of situations if the information is
interpreted properly and used correctly.

5.2.2.2 Rule 7 Risk of Collision
Rule 7 (b) requires proper use of radar to obtain an early warning of risks of
collision. If AIS is integrated with Radar/ARPA, AIS information shown on
Radar/ARPA screens can definitely provide an early warning of the risks of collision.
AIS can overcome Radar limitations in early warnings as defined in Chapter III. It
therefore follows that OOWs should properly observe AIS information on a Radar
Screen to acquire early warning. Stitt (2004) argues that Rule 7(b) could include
intelligent correlation of radar and AIS information. Details, such as course and
speed as obtained by ARPA or other methods of plotting, should be compared with
AIS information and the causes of any substantial differences should be determined.
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5.2.2.3 Rules 8, 16 and 17 AIS-an Important Monitoring Role
AIS’s principle and its capabilities make it play an important monitoring role. This
role can meet the requirements that certain Rules, such as Rule 8, Rule 16 and 17
provide. Stitt (2004) emphasises that:

Not only can AIS assist OOWs to make an early assessment of if a
risk of collision exists, but also subsequently enable them to monitor
action taken by other ships. The dynamic messages show much earlier
and more accurate information than radar of if the other ship alters the
course and speed. In addition, the static messages present a broad
picture of the other ship’s size and type, and hence the OOW can
anticipate her likely manoeuvring features.

According to Rules 5, 7, 8, 16,17 and so on, during training, navigators should
acquire the capabilities of properly interpreting and using AIS information for
collision avoidance, as well as maintaining good situational awareness. In addition,
the ability for correlation of Radar and AIS information, as well as recognization of
material differences between AIS and Radar/ARPA information, should also be
acquired. Furthermore, the effective use of AIS information to monitor a ship’s
safety of passage should be an integral part of any syllabus.

5.2.3 AIS Training-related Requirements in STCW Code
STCW95 is a framework for seafarer training today. It was designed in such a way
that regulations in the Convention and provisions in the Code correspond to each
other. The detailed technical requirements and their supporting Resolution are also
provided in the Code. All technical provisions in STCW 95 were specified in less
ambiguous language. Moreover, provisions of the Code define the minimum
requirements of MET and IMO has developed a series of Model Courses to guide
seafarer training in light of the technical provisions.
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Although the STCW 95 Code does not make specific references to AIS training
directly, Regulation I/14 and Table A-II are associated with it.

5.2.3.1 Interpretation of Regulation I/14
Subparagraph 1.4 of Regulation I/14 states that companies are responsible for
ensuring that seafarers are familiar with all equipment relevant to their routine or
emergency duties. Thus, it can be interpreted that companies are responsible for
navigators to be familiar with AIS, especially in respect of operation, limitations and
capabilities. Even though, in the near future, AIS-related training can be carried out
widely, the familiarization with ship-specific AIS operation is still needed. Stitt
(2004) argues that because different manufacturers will have different “bells and
whistles” on their equipment (AIS), a significant part of any training appears likely
to have to be devoted to how to use a particular set.

One can imagine that because of limited financial resources, a training center is
likely fitted with a specific brand of AIS; the demonstration during AIS training will
be based on the AIS operation procedure of that brand. However, on board ship
OOWs will probably face another brand of AIS. Hence efficient ship-specific AIS
familiarization is needed. Section A-I/14 states that companies and masters have the
responsibility for ensuring that newly employed seafarers are familiar with the
specific equipment and the associated operation procedures relating to their duties.
Subparagraph 2.2 in this section indicates that familiarization should not be a selfstudy by running an hour-long CD or by reading the manufacturers’ handbooks. A
knowledgeable officer should be assigned to provide enough instructions and
demonstrations to newcomers until they can operate ship-specific AIS properly.
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5.2.3.2 Technical References in Table A-II
Column 2 implicates that trainees should acquire:
• Knowledge of AIS operating principles, limitations, sources of error,
detection of misrepresentation of information and methods of corrections;
• The ability to determine ships position by using electronic navigational aids
which should include AIS;
• The ability to operate and to interpret and analyse AIS information shown
on Radar/ARPA screens;
• The ability to obtain an accurate position by using AIS;
• The ability to evaluate navigational information from all sources, including
AIS, Radar/ARPA, and in turn to make decisions for collision avoidance.

Column 3 can be interpreted in such a way that AIS training can be carried out on
approved PCs or multi-media, and approved simulators, as well as approved inservice experience.

Column 4, implicates that Navigators should be capable of:
• Performance checks and tests to navigation systems, including AIS,
complying with a manufacturer’s recommendations and good practices;
• Correcting interpretation and analysing of information from Radar/ARPA,
including AIS information being shown on screens, while considering the
limitations of AIS;
• Taking action to avoid a close encounter or collision.
5.2.4 IMO Resolution for Operational Use of AIS
Resolution A. 917 (22) was adopted in November 2001. In the Resolution the
purpose of AIS is stressed, i.e. to help identify vessels; assist in target tracking;
simplify information exchange; and provide additional information to assist
situational awareness. The Resolution states the minimum requirements that the user
should meet before using AIS. Furthermore, the Resolution focuses on detailed
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description of the system regarding operational and technical aspects as well as
shore-based application.

Finally, the Resolution is a practical instrument that

training officers can refer to for developing an effective AIS training syllabus and
can be considered as a blue book for such. A well-developed syllabus should at least
meet the minimum requirements as set out.

5.3 Current Situations of AIS Installation

Compared with training for other electronic equipment, AIS training is much further
behind than the installation process itself. In addition, technical standards to develop
AIS and to integrate it with other electronic equipment are still being developed.
Therefore, when on board, OOWs might have to operate differential AIS in terms of
the technical aspects. Hence it is necessary to analyse the situations of AIS
installation, in order to develop valid training programs.

Larry Bischoff of Holland American Line explains that for fleet standardization and
budget considerations he has postponed making a connection between ECDIS and
AIS for the whole fleet until it has become ”plug-N-play”. He added that connecting
ECDIS and AIS on the IAANDAM AND VOLENDAM showed that it prolongs
installation and is not foolproof. Dave Smith of Alaska Tanker Company plans to use
the minimum keyboard display at least until the dust settles (Pot, 2002).
Like the initial radar sets, some AIS equipment is not particularly user friendly. The
abridged timetable means that the first generation equipment, usually in the form of
MKD, will be around for years to come. Many ship owners are unlikely to be willing
to upgrade their equipment until forced to do so (Stitt, 2004).
Because MKD AIS will exist for a long time, during AIS training, MKD AIS
operation, its capabilities and limitations, information interpretation, especially in
association with radar targets shall take a part of the syllabus. Some AIS may have
connections with few other sources, whereas others may have more sources. The
potential sources should be re-stressed during the training (See Figure 5-1). Some data can be
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GPS:
-COG/SOG
-Ship’s Positions
-Position Time Stamp In
(UTC)

Gyro Compass:
-Rate of turn
-Heading

VDR
(Own ship)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

AIS
(Built in GPS)

Speed Log:
-SOG (optional)

(5)

OOW:
Message Input
-Navigational status
-Voyage-related
-Short safety-related

Radar/ARPA display
ECDIS
MKD
Stand-alone Graphic
AIS Display
Pilot Laptop Display

Long Rang AIS Track
(in the future)

(Source: Berking, 2004)

Figure 5-1 AIS Connections on Board a Ship
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fed to AIS automatically but certain other data should be entered manually,
especially dynamic messages, such as, cargo names, destinations, ports of call,
draught of ship, as well as safety-related messages. Trainees should acquire the
capabilities to decide what data should be entered and upgraded. Furthermore, as
long as there are many AISs integrated with Radar/ARPA, ECDIS, AIS training
should not ignore the links among them. The limitations and proper use of AIS
information on ECDIS, Radar/ARPA should be identified in a training program.

5.4 Overview of Current Situations of AIS Training

Due to the hurried process to equip vessels with AIS to meet the anti-terrorism
requirements, manufacturers have failed to give enough time to the development of
AIS concerning performance, operation procedures, integration and communication
protocol etc. Unlike GMDSS, the AIS training mechanism is very incomplete.
Therefore Party States find it difficult to produce effective standards to cover AIS
training. In addition, training centers have not developed effective programs to carry
out AIS training. Until now, AIS training is not mandatory and training programs
vary from one training center to another. In fact, most navigators have not received
efficient training before AIS is presented to them.

5.4.1 An AIS Training Program of MTC
The Makarov Training Centre (MTC), St Petersburg, Russia, has developed AIS training
programs for OOW engaged in AIS use and maintenance for safety of navigation. The
programs are as follows:
• International and Russian national legal documents regulating
AIS installation, operation and servicing;
• AIS Network structure;
• Specific features of installation and operation;
• AIS use for collision prevention;
• Basic principles of formation and functioning.
(MTC, 2004)
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This training program seems very brief and many important items have not been
included. There are some other training programs, being carried out in other training
centers which are similar to this, only meeting the requirements to a certain extent
that some regulations and provisions in COLREG and STCW 95 can be understood.
Thus, a complete and efficient training program should be developed to meet these
requirements so that trainees can use AIS properly.

5.4.2 Limitations of Current Available AIS Training on Board
In most cases, after installing an AIS, the manufacturer provides a CD for the OOW’s
self-study. Some CDs cover the operation for only 3-line display in a stand-alone MKD
AIS and others may cover more about the operation of AIS on Radar/ARPA or ECDIS
screen, if the integration of AIS with this equipment has been achieved.

Such CDs definitely show the operation procedures of the specific brand of AIS.
This is enough for OOWs to know how to operate the AIS but probably there is
nothing related to the limitations of AIS, as well as its deficiencies. There is no
reason to criticise manufacturers for not describing some of them because there are
no resolutions or Resolution to cover this. Furthermore, some trials to examine the
limitations or deficiencies of AIS have been carried out recently and the results need
to be assessed further. There are several AIS conferences that have been held
recently or are about to be carried out in the near future. More evidence needs to be
collected to support the research results. This is a reason why the current CD selfstudy training is not efficient for OOWs to be competent to use AIS properly.

5.4.3 Lack of Awareness of AIS Training
It seems that OOWs ignore the importance of AIS training on board. They use
Radar/ARPA daily, and they push a button, then an information window pops up or
pops out. They can get what they want by touching a button. It appears that when
AIS is fitted, using the manufacturers’ handbooks or CD guides, they can also
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operate it and AIS works as the handbooks or CDs say. Therefore it is a good excuse
to say that no more AIS training is needed. OOWs who have operated GPSs may
have the experience that it is easy to operate and properly conclude that AIS
operation is not any more difficult than that of GPS. However, navigators have
already learnt a lesson from the ROYAL MAJESTY’s grounding, a GPS-assisted
accident. Meanwhile there is a persistent belief that if AIS is integrated with a
Radar/ARPA and someone can operate Radar/ARPA, then he/she can operate AIS
too. If such is the case, then it would be difficult for OOWs to recognise the
importance of AIS training. In an AIS 03 seminar, Pratt & Taylor (2004) introduced
the results of pilots’ survey for an AIS process of installation on board ships calling
at Southampton and the Tees Bay. They released that:

A number of ships officers on the inquired ships knew little of or indeed
had heard nothing about. There appeared to be little evidence of any
formalized training, and navigators are given a few words by the
installation technician or refer to the information in the manufacturers’
handbooks about the use of AIS. They add that unfortunately many
OOWs don’t recognize the necessity of AIS training.

In view of the current status of training related to AIS, there is not enough that
involves the capabilities and limitations of AIS. To solve these problems, there is a
need for better cooperation among the manufacturers, shipowners, navigators,
training centers and administrators. Firstly, manufacturers should contribute to the
capabilities and certain limitations of AIS in terms of technical aspects. Secondly,
navigators who have the experience of using AIS in reality should provide feedback
about AIS deficiencies and/or limitations in operation aspects. Thirdly, shipowners
should take the responsibility for collecting this feedback and present it to other
interested parties. Shipowners should also be in charge of on board AIS
familiarization training. Finally, the administrators should become the coordinators
in order to accelerate the development of AIS training programs.
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Stitt (2004) says that currently most OOWs are not trained properly for the use of
AIS, as well as its potential benefits and shortcomings, because AIS capabilities and
limitations have not yet been properly recognized. He adds that the increased
emphasis is now being set on anti-terrorist and ship-to-shore applications. Thus it can
be concluded that training for these aspects tends to be the major part of the syllabus.
As a result, much less training time is allocated to the training of the effective use of
AIS for collision avoidance and situational awareness. With these limitations, AIS
training effectiveness is compromised.

60

Chapter VI

Suggestions to Improve AIS Training

Chapter VI

Suggestions to Improve AIS Training

“Man is the single greatest asset the shipowner has. He is worth
looking after, and money spent training him to understand and operate
technology will pay handsome dividends”.
(John Lang, Chief Inspector Admiral of MAIB, 2002)

6.1 Introduction

The technology is changing faster than the development of training-related rules.
Administers and training centers are scrambling to keep up. Without guidance by
training standards, training syllabi at an early stage may always be different from one
training center to another and, in turn, it is difficult to assess the competency of
trainees against a widely accepted standard.

Training is an effective tool to keep OOWs updated with technical change.
Consequently they can use high-tech equipment to serve safety rather than to make
accidents. IMO has been aware of the importance of training for technical change,
and W.A. O’Neil has emphasised this point in a few articles, summarising that:

The equipment used on ships is becoming more and more sophisticated.
It is not correct to say the technology will provide a solution to certain
problems, because unless properly used technology could make the
problem worse. This means that the seafarers who have to use it need to
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be very highly trained. We have to make sure that training keeps pace
with technical change. (O’Neil, 1999)

The United Kingdom has further raised the training requirements for the operation of
AIS at STW 34 through documents STW 34/9/4. However, since STW 34 no further
development of AIS training appears to have materialized, mainly due to the fact that
the performance standards have not been finalised. During IMO STW 35th Session,
the International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA) submitted a
proposal to highlight the requirements for shipboard AIS training once again. The
proposal suggests that:

Whilst AIS is being implemented to meet security demands, there is
no doubt that with proper training the use of AIS will enhance safe
navigation. There is an operational requirement for AIS to be
operational in 2004 and the operational training will not be available
at this time. This will mean that many of operational benefits derived
from AIS will not be understood by the users. Therefore the
requirements to have proper standardised training requirements for
operators of AIS is needing urgent consideration.
(IMO STW 35, November 2003)

IFSMA also recommends that it would not be necessary to amend the STCW
Convention as the reference to AIS equipment already exists within the Convention.
The training module relating to AIS could be introduced by developing a Model
Course in a similar manner to ECDIS (IMO STW 35, November 2003).

Not only shall AIS training focus on the operation of the system itself, but also stress
any inherent limitations as well as an awareness of risk when using the system. John
Long (2002) 1emphasized that when carrying out training related to hi-tech, three

1

John Long’s opinion was quoted in Computerisation of bridges and engine rooms:Progress or
regression (2002, May/July). gardnews, 166,10-12.
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issues must be considered: an ability to operate the system or equipment correctly; an
understanding of any limitations and an awareness of the distraction factor.

The fact is that not only do OOWs need to use the information from AIS properly,
but they should also be capable of filtering appropriate data from several sources and
make decisions based on that. If AIS training is well organized, then it could ensure
that OOWs are competent to do this. In order to ensure that OOWs are competent in
using AIS information properly and in operating AIS correctly, besides effective onshore training, on-board training is also important.

6.2 On-shore Training

Until now, AIS training is not mandatory, apart from the mandatory carriage
requirements of AIS. However, on-shore training has already been carried out in
many training centers even though the syllabus is very different among training
centers. To achieve the competency for OOWs to use AIS, consideration should be
given to the way of carrying on-shore training. Stitt (2004) suggests that, for onshore training, time could be better spent on the techniques and procedures for using
the information that AIS can provide to avoid collisions. In respect of cost benefit
and short shore-leave for OOWs, AIS training can be incorporated into ECDIS or
Radar/ARPA training.

6.2.1 Key Elements of Training Syllabus
A syllabus is a crucial part of any training program and it could be developed in such
a way that it could take into account both the current situation and the future. Party
States may develop guidelines to affect current AIS training based on current
provisions in STCW 95 and AIS related regulations given by other party states.

Besides the statement of the aims, objectives and learning outcomes, a training
syllabus should at least cover the following key elements:
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(1)

AIS legislation, regulations, guidelines and requirements;

(2)

Basic AIS operating principles;

(3)

AIS capabilities and limitations defined in Chapter IV;

(4)

Criteria of presentation of AIS information;

(5)

Scenarios and exercises developed for navigators to be familiar with
the use of AIS;

(6)

Major differences of AIS and Radar/ARPA information;

(7)

Shore-base AIS application.

6.2.2 Exercises and Scenarios of Simulation Training
With respect to the current situation, if AIS training is completely incorporated into
ECDIS, and/or Radar/ARPA training, it might be insufficient for competency
purposes because stand-alone MKD AIS training is still needed. The training should
take into account both aspects, i.e. MKD AIS training and integrated AIS. However,
integration of AIS with Radar/ARPA and/or ECDIS is the future philosophy of AIS
development. While training can be carried out on a PC, or simulator, training on real
AIS equipment will definitely be the most efficient.

AIS manufacturers normally provide CDs for the end users’ self-study. Training
centers should be fitted with more than one brand of real AIS equipment. Therefore,
training officers will have some CDs to demonstrate the basic operations of MKD
AIS. The CDs can be run on computers. For the purpose of demonstration, this might
be useful. However, such CDs might not be designed to run on simulators.
Meanwhile, manufacturers have not done enough to develop effective exercises and
scenarios for training purposes. The fact is that such CDs are produced by AIS
manufacturers rather than simulator producers or training program developers with a
pedagogical background, thus might not meet the demands of training. Hence
training officers need to develop AIS training exercises and scenarios or to get the
professional companies to do this for their own needs.
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When designing exercises, consideration should be given to the following concerns:
(1)

The exercises should focus on developing trainees’ capabilities to
interpret, analyse and apply AIS information to ensure safety;

(2)

The exercises should include both normal situations and abnormal
phenomena, such as:

(3)

•

Failure of AIS connected sensors;

•

Failure of AIS components.

Besides some exercises that are designed for MKD AIS, others
should be integrated with Radar/ARPA, and/or ECDIS training.

AIS training scenarios might be difficult to develop. However, many VTS centers are
equipped with sophisticated systems and traffic images with AIS information display
around VTS areas can be filmed. Information technology makes it possible to run
these films on computers and simulators, thus allowing training officers to access
films for training purposes. Many training objectives can be achieved by presenting
scenario-recorded films, such as AIS information interpretation, recognization of AIS
symbols on Radar/ARPA, ECDIS as well as path predication etc. In addition, in
order to improve training effectiveness, trainees’ involvement is necessary during
simulator training. Appropriate training software needs to be developed, something
that is the duty of specialized training program developers. However, training
officers need to define what exercises and scenarios should be created for effective
AIS training.

6.3 On-board AIS Training

After on-shore AIS training, on-board training and hands on practices are still
important to keep OOWs fully competent. Besides familiarization, Captains should
aim to encourage OOWs to use AIS daily, while also paying attention to increasing
the OOWs’ capabilities of interpreting AIS information not only displayed on MKD,
but also on Radar/ARPA and ECDIS screens.
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6.3.1 A Lesson from GMDSS Training
The Author has been a GMDSS training officer for years in China. During the
training, the Author has carried out some surveys on how efficient OOWs use
GMDSS equipment. The surveys give some suggestions about how on-board AIS
training should be carried out besides on-shore training. GMDSS training has been
carried out for years. It is expected that after training, OOWs are competent in using
GMDSS equipment properly for both routine and emergency duties.

However, due to the reduction of the manning level and the reallocation of
communication and emergency duties, it seems that only Captains can access
GMDSS equipment. In some cases, 3rd officers can be allowed to operate the
equipment, as they are supposed to execute communication tasks in an emergency.
Other OOWs will not be allowed to access GMDSS, because of the sensitive
information coming in or out via it. No doubt the capabilities of OOWs to operate
GMDSS equipment will be reduced due to not operating them over a long period.

On-shore training does not work well without the support of on-board training.
Previously seafaring has been a sort of hands on career whereas, nowadays, it
appears to be high technology oriented. However some basic knowledge and handson experience is still important. Besides ship-specific AIS formularization, repetition
of operating AIS is also necessary. During this process, the ability to handle AIS will
be improved and safety awareness and responsibilities can be acquired. On-board
training is particularly efficient in these aspects because seafarers are loyal to their
employers; they love the ships and are easy to motivate and are committed. During
the first several years of GMDSS equipment on-board, a lot of false alarms caused by
false operations were received and the SAR organizations issued circulars to
emphasize the problems. Party States have asked training centers to address these
problems during on-shore training while ship owners have given their masters
instructions to solve the problem. It is becoming better now, because of the
awareness concerning the effects on safety together with the impact of training.
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Thus, a lesson should be learnt from GMDSS application, when carrying out onboard AIS training.

6.3.2 Keeping Competency by Doing
During a presentation in 2003 at WMU, Mr Olsen, the Sale Representative of
Poseidon Simulation AS, showed some statistics reporting that a majority of marine
accident alarms in Norwegian coastal waters had been sent from mobile phones
(Olsen, 2003). This means that people use mobile phones on s daily basis, and in turn
they are familiar with the operation procedures. Naturally they will pick mobile
phones up and send alerts out in cases of emergency. Therefore, It follows that if
OOWs operate AIS often, they will be familiar with it and willing to touch it.
Furthermore, if OOWs handle AIS information regularly, they will be much more
sensitive to the information it gives, especially those related to collision avoidance.
Therefore, as soon as certain strange information occurs, it will be quickly
recognised and lead OOWs to analyse what is going wrong.

6.3.3 Organization of On-board Training
The responsibilities laid down in the STCW Code require companies to be in charge
of on-board training and Captains to carry out on-board AIS training. On-board
training needs to be well organized to achieve its objectives. To do that,
consideration should be given to the following issues:
(1)

Effective use of on-board training materials, resources, aids;

(2)

Taking care of generation differences between the younger and the older one;

(3)

Focusing on ship-specific AIS operation and its limitations;

(4)

Familiarization of ship-specific AIS connected sensors and their limitations;

(5)

Awareness of integration situations of AIS into IBS;

(6)

Special requirements of AIS application for anti-terrorist application

(7)

Well designed training activities, such as follows:
• Captain’s inquiry of OOWs about AIS basic operational knowledge to
discover how an OOW is competent;
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• A discussion among OOWs to consider confusions and clarify them.
(8)

Including the following AIS-related activities in the departure and/or
daily duty shift schedules:
• Updating of AIS dynamic data;
• Checking of the integration of AIS.

(9)

Using AIS information as an integral part of on-boarding training for cadets;

(10) Exercises on the correct interpretation of AIS data for both MKD display
and integrated ones;
(11) Predicting path by a target’s ROT.

Although it is claimed that hi-tech equipment greatly releases navigator’s regional
workload, it has also been observed that their overall workload is increasing
considerably. Ship turnover is much quicker than before. It is difficult to organize
effective on-board training, especially on coastal or short voyage ships. On-board
training might be more effective and easy to organize on deep-sea ships. Companies
might make a policy to assign cadets to on-board ocean voyage ships so that they can
receive well-organized on-board training. In addition, because AIS, as a member of
IBS, will interact with other equipment on the bridge, AIS training could also be part
of the integral training of IBS. In particular, Radar/ARPA, ECDIS and AIS could be
considered as a whole; hence on-board AIS training of this equipment should be
incorporated. In this way, cadets would understand that this equipment works
together with and affects the other items.

Existing approved references are enough to be referred to in developing an effective
syllabus. There is a need for faithful interpretation of relevant provisions in these
instruments; therefore, amendments to STCW 95 may not need to be hurried. Both onshore training and on-board training should be emphasised to ensure OOWs
competence for using AIS properly. Besides training for the capacities of AIS, the
inherent limitations and risk of over-reliance on the system should be stressed.
Learning by doing should thus become the philosophy of AIS training.
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Chapter VII
Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Conclusions
From the discussions in this paper, the findings of this researcher may be
summarised briefly as follows: reservation of traditional skills is necessary in the
event of failure of AIS and other high-tech equipment in IBS; the roles of AIS and
it’s negative effects on collision avoidance need to be well known; proper training is
necessary for the OOWs to be competent in using AIS properly.

7.1.1 Reservation of Traditional Skills
When examining contents laid down in Table II, STCW Code, besides requirements
of capabilities of using modern technology, traditional skills, such as celestial,
terrestrial and coastal navigation, are also required to meet requirements of
competency. High-tech equipment in IBS makes ships much easier to be commanded
than before, without much input of the OOW. However, it can be two-side edge for
safety. When it goes wrong, the OOW will be less dependent on it. In this sense,
traditional navigational skills will be the back-up in the event of failure of such
equipment in IBS.

Training should focus on not only modern electronic technology, but also on
traditional navigational skills. The young generation should be aware of the
importance of traditional navigational skill and should understand that AIS, is not
designed to replace navigators, but to support them to keep surveillance awareness
and make decision of collision avoidance.
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7.1.2 Awareness of the Roles of AIS
Although AIS can greatly enhance situation awareness and provide valuable
information for collision avoidance if properly used, the roles of AIS in IBS should
be re-examined and reconsidered. AIS should be recognised as:
•

An information providing system;

•

One of the important navigational tools;

•

A dependent system from external sensors;

•

It does not replace Radar/ARPA but AIS and Radar can complement each other;

•

Human elements are involved in updating certain AIS information;

•

The use of AIS does not negate OOWs’ responsibility in COLREGs and does
not affect the composition of watch keeping;

•

AIS may not provide a complete picture of the traffic flow around a ship:

•

OOW should not place over-reliance on AIS;

•

Crosschecking with other data is essential before using AIS information.

7.1.3 Awareness of Negative Effects of AIS on Safety
Firstly, the OOW should know that some types of ships might not be equipped with
AIS and that AIS fitted on other ships might be switched off at Captains’ discretion.
AIS cannot detect non-AIS small boats and the ships that their AIS are switched off.
Early warning alarm on collision targets has been incorporated as a result of the
introduction of AIS. This will alert the OOW to a collision risk at an early stage even
before it can be detected by Radar or visually. However, this can lead to the OOW
being over-reliant on AIS. This is specially a risk in case of the non-AIS targets
which cannot be detected at an earlier stage. The AIS is not a substitute for officer
lookout but can only provide supplementary information for collision avoidance and
situation awareness. It should not be used as a sole source of navigation information
but only as a tool to enhance the safety of navigation

Secondly, the integration between AIS and ECDIS & Radar/ARPA has not yet been
achieved currently. Since AIS information cannot be overlaid on Radar or ECDIS, its
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benefits will be compromised considerably. Most ships have been fitted with MKD
AIS and the MKD AIS itself has less contribution to safety. The OOW has to
associate AIS targets with Radar targets by the target bearing and range shown on the
MKD AIS in order to identify other ships. Whether this can benefit a ship’s safety
depends on the OOW’s capability to correlate the two targets properly.

Thirdly, the integrity, reliability and accuracy of AIS source data cannot necessarily
be relied upon since the use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)
and the accuracy and validity of COG/SOG output are not required by approved
standards currently. The OOW should be aware that the accuracy of dynamic AIS
information depends on the other ship’s equipment and that the reliability of static,
voyage related and short safety related messages might decrease since Humans are
involved in putting these data in the system. Hence, the accuracy of all received AIS
information including that of position, COG and SOG, should not be relied upon
until the integrity of the information is proved. The OOW should do cross-checking
with other data before using the AIS information.

Finally, the AIS should be installed at a position from which the ship is normally
operated. It is much preferred to place the AIS as close as possible to Radar/ARPA,
or ECDIS. However, there are some ships on which the AIS are at improper places.
On those ships, the AIS can be a watchkeeping distraction if it is not used properly.
The OOW should be aware of its negative effects on safety.

7.1.4 The Need for AIS Training
Firstly, the urgent need for proper standardised training requirements for operators of
AIS has been highlighted in the 35th session of IMO STW in 2004. ALSO, Paragraph
2 of IMO Resolution A.917 (22) states that the user should become familiar with the
operation of the equipment, including the correct interpretation of the displayed data.
Without the proper operational training, many of the operational benefits derived
from AIS will not be understood by the users. Thus, the users should receive the
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approved AIS training in order to be competent in using the system properly and
interpreting its information displayed on the Radar Screen or ECDIS. Such training is
the key to empower the users to be aware of the limitations and capabilities of the
AIS as well as the consequences of transmission of outdated data.

Secondly, the AIS has become a number of IBS currently. Although the MKD AIS
meets the minimum carriage requirement of SOLAS ships, the presentation of AIS
on Radar is included in the Draft Radar Performance Standards for ship-borne Radar
Equipment submitted by Norway in the 50th session of IMO NAV in 2004. Thus, the
new ship-borne radar equipment will be able to display AIS information.
Furthermore, AIS information can also be presented on ECDIS. Therefore, on the
same screen, the OOWs will face different sources of information and this
information will be complicatedly associated, which will bring some inherent
deficiencies. Hence, the OOWs should know the criteria of the association of the
information as well as its deficiencies so that they can use the displayed AIS
information correctly to handle the ships in a safe manner.

Thirdly, the necessity of AIS training has not yet been properly recognized presently
and most navigators have not received proper training before using the AIS on board.
Although, the manufacturers may provide the operational manuals and CDs for on
board self-study training, which are focused on the particular brands of the AIS.
These materials are not enough to keep the users to be competent in using the AIS
and interpreting the displayed AIS information correctly. Therefore, both on-shore
AIS training in accordance with approved standards and well-organized on-board
training are important for the OOWs to be competent to use AIS properly.

Finally, Training can be an effective tool in training navigators to be competent in
handling AIS generated information and its interpretation, failure of external data
input, crosschecking of information and enabling AIS to contribute to the safety
rather than to cause accidents. Companies will always gain when spending money on
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seafaring training. The rewards of that for safety can be huge. Both on-board training
and on-shore training should consist of company policy for safety culture and the
companies should organize for the AIS training.

7.2 Recommendations
Based on the study in this paper, an AIS training syllabus is proposed; suggestions to
amendments of ATCW 95 are given; how to use AIS properly on board a ship and
how to choose a proper AIS training program are recommended.
7.2.1 Using AIS properly and Attending Shore-based AIS Training
With regard to current situations of installation of stand-alone MKD AIS, OOWs
may have a little benefit from potentials of AIS in collision avoidance. In addition,
without proper training in using AIS, it can be a factor of watch keeping distraction.
In view of these limitations, a company perhaps whose whole fleet is equipped with
MKD AIS, can make a policy to guide the OOWs on MKD AIS for broadcasting
information to other ships or shore-based authorities. The OOWs should be informed
of the potential risks of using a MKD AIS as a tool for assisting in collision
avoidance.
On-board training may also focus on basic operation of MKD AIS, choices of data
input etc. It is believed that in the future, with software development, AIS can be
integrated with Radar/ARPA, or ECDIS by “plug N play”. Therefore, when taking
shore-based AIS training programs, those that cover both a MKD AIS and integrated
one would be appreciated. If part of training can be run on simulation, it is believed
that training effectiveness will be greatly improved. On the other hand, the OOWs
might have a little chance to operate integrated AIS on board. Therefore they may
quickly loose their capabilities to handle integrated AIS. Therefore, on board training can
be effective in updating the capabilities by Distance Learning. By this way, the OOWs
could be updated for integrated AIS operation. This will contribute to safety greatly.
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7. 2.2 Amendments of STCW 95
STCW 95 should also be amended so that mandatory AIS training can be introduced
and AIS training provisions can be inserted. However, if whether it is the correct
time to amend STCW 95 is questionable. Probably not now, because many ships
have been equipped with MKD type AIS and Integration of AIS with other ship
borne electronic equipment is still being developed. Moreover, capabilities and
limitations are being discovered through a series of trials. It can be a long process to
develop effective provisions to be added into the STCW Code to guide effective AIS
training at the moment. The AIS training provisions should come out when the dust
settles.

Existing Conventions, Guidelines, Regulations do provide a legal framework for
developing AIS training programs. The key point is how interested parties interpret
them faithfully so that these instruments can guide a well-developed training
syllabus. Amendments to STCW 95 on the AIS training should not be done in a
similar way to that of the AIS installation. More time should be given to develop
realistic and practical provisions to cover the AIS training. In addition, when
amending STCW 95, the training for ECDIS, VDR and Radar/ARPA should be
synchronized with the AIS training for ergonomic principles and user-friendly
purposes.

7.2.3 AIS Training Syllabus
A well-developed AIS training syllabus is the key to achieve the objectives of the
training. Based on the study of this paper, an AIS training syllabus is proposed. The
syllabus meets basic requirements of current legal instruments on the basis of faithful
interpretation and covers both basic operations of AIS and capabilities and
limitations of using AIS on collision avoidance. When developing the syllabus, some
proposals submitted by IMO Party States during sessions of Sub. Committee on
safety of navigation have been referred. This syllabus can be used to develop an AIS
training program. It is the author’s belief that the syllabus can contribute to the
validity of AIS training. The details of the syllabus are shown on Table 7-1.
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Syllabus of AIS Training1
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency
1. Legal aspects and requirements
Area objectives: Describe the essential legal aspects and responsibilities in the use of AIS
1.1 Explain:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6

SOLAS Chapter V, carriage requirements
STCW 95 training requirements related to AIS
COLREGs Rules related to AIS operation
IMO performance standards for AIS, A.74 (69)
IMO Resolution A.917 (22)
USCG MTSA AIS operation requirements

2. AIS principles and Basic operations
Area objectives: Explain AIS principles and describe AIS basic operations.
1.2 Explain:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.10
.11
.12
.13

The fundamental principles of AIS
Coverage of AIS
AIS system (overview)
Technical description of AIS
Activation of AIS units
AIS components, functionalities, connections
Different types of AIS information sent by ships
Different update rates of AIS data
Difference between AIS stabilised mode and Radar/ARPA stabilised mode
“Pseudo” AIS information
Unified and coordinated messages for AIS information
Master discretion of switching off AIS and recording the action
An automatic built-in integrity test (BIIT)

1.3 Describe:
.1
Setting up and maintaining an AIS display
.2
Basic AIS operation at MKD level
.3
Advanced operation integration of AIS with Radar/ARPA, ECDIS etc
.4
Manual input of data
.5
Checks of AIS input information, including the following items:
•
Failure of heading information and ROT
•
Failure of COG/SOG
•
Position input information
•
Outdated voyage data

1

IMO Reference, Textbooks/Publication are referred to the Bibliography in this dissertation.
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3. AIS capabilities and limitations
Area objectives: Describe AIS capabilities and limitations as well as their impacts on safety.
3.1 Describe:
.1 AIS capabilities on collision avoidance
•
Automatic Identification and dynamic data indication
•
Path prediction provided by AIS
•
Course change erroneously observed on an ARPA and a significant
improvement provided by AIS
•
Compensation of respective deficiencies between AIS and Radar
.2 AIS limitations on collision avoidance
.3 Non-SOLAS ships and SOLAS ships switching off AIS
.4 Incomplete picture of the situation around the ships
.5 Non-integration between AIS and ECDIS & Radar/ARPA
.6 Limitations of using MKD AIS
.7 Impacts of a poorly located AIS display unit on safety
3.2 Explain:
.1

Awareness of AIS triggered safety issues on bridge

4. Presentation of AIS
Area objectives: Knowledge AIS presentation status and symbols of AIS; Describe characteristics of
presentation of AIS data, and how to analyse and interpret AIS information.
4.1 Knowledge:
.1 AIS presentation status
•
AIS ON/OFF
•
Filtering of AIS sleeping targets
•
Automatic activation of AIS targets
•
CPA/TCPA alarm
•
Lost Target alarm
•
Target association
.2
Symbols of AIS targets data and of Radar/ARPA targets data
.3 Operational alarms and indications of AIS information
4.2 Describe:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.10

AIS display characteristics
AIS data presenting on a MKD AIS
The correct interpretation of the displayed data
Recognizing dangerous targets and assessing safety situations
Distinguishing target data from AIS or Radar/ARPA or from a combination of these two.
Distinguishing incomplete received AIS information
monitoring own ships AIS data on request
AIS and Radar automatic target association function and criteria of target association
Correlation of AIS and Radar/ARPA information
Determination of any substantial differences of information from both AIS and Radar
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5. Sensors
Area objectives: Describe the performance limits of sensors and assess their impact on the safe use of
AIS
5.1 Explain:
.1
.2
.3

The performance limits concerning availability, accuracy and integrity of all
navigational sensors connected to AIS (as defined in Figure 5 -1)
Awareness of a deterioration in sensor performance
Analysis and interpretation of failure indication of sensors

6. Roles of AIS
Area objectives: Describe the roles that AIS acts in IBS and their impacts on safety; Explain the
potential risks of using AIS to ships
6.1 Describe:
.1 AIS-an additional source for navigational information
.2 AIS not replacing but supporting navigational systems
.3 No negative impact on responsibility in COLREGS when using AIS
6.2 Explain:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5

A potential risk of data inaccuracy in inherent in AIS
Errors/inaccuracies of sensors’ data
Risks of over-reliance on AIS
The necessity of crosschecking of information in a navigational watch
Assessment of integrity of the system and all data at all times

7. Shore-based AIS application
Area objectives: Describe further AIS application on shore and its impact on ship safety.
7.1 Describe:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7

Text message sent by VTS centers
(D)GNSS corrections
Functionality of AIS in SAR operation and a long range applications
AIDs to navigation
Use of AIS in ship reporting and routeing
A land-based AIS system and Common Baltic Sea Monitoring System
AIS information for anti-terrorist purpose

Table 7-1 A syllabus of AIS training
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Appendix I
An Overview of AIS

Figure 2 - AIS Components
(Source: IMO, 2002)
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Appendix II
Technical Description of AIS 1
1, AIS operates primarily on two dedicated VHF channels (AIS1 - 161,975 MHz and
AIS2 - 162,025 MHz). Where these channels are not available regionally, the AIS is
capable of automatically switching to alternate designated channels.

2, The required ship reporting capacity according to the IMO performance standard
amounts to a minimum of 2000 time slots per minute (see figure 1). The ITU
Technical Standard for the Universal AIS provides 4500 time slots per minute. The
broadcast mode is based on a principle called (S)TDMA (Self-organized Time
Division Multiple Access) that allows the system to be overloaded by 400 to 500%
and still provide nearly 100% throughput for ships closer than 8 to 10 NM to each
other in a ship-to-ship mode. In the event of system overload, only targets far away
will be subject to drop-out in order to give preference to targets close by that are a
primary concern for ship-to-ship operation of AIS. In practice, the capacity of the
system is unlimited, allowing for a great number of ships to be accommodated at the
same time.

Figure 1 - Principles of TDMA

1

Derived from IMO Resolution A.917 (22)
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AIS DISPLAY OPTIONS
AIS
IMO 4 ITU 4
IEC WIP

ECDIS IMO 4
IEC 4*

NEMA 2000
Interface

ARPA IMO 4
IEC 4*

Remote or
Integrated
MIN DISPLAY
& HMI
4 = Approved standard & spec
* = AIS requirements TBD
WIP = Work in Progress

RADAR IMO 4
IEC 4*
ECS RTCM SC 109 Standards WIP*
INS IMO 4
IEC WIP*
CONNING/ MANUEVERING DISPLAY

Tactical Situation
Display (optional)

PILOT CARRY-ABOARD
(Portable Piloting Unit)
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(Source: Ross, 2004)

Appendix III-2

AIS ELEMENTS
Disp la y

ARP A
ECDIS

Assemble

Laptop

ECS

Disp la ys incomin g
vessel information on
a suitable device

Communication

HD G
OOW
GP S/ COG input
D GP S S p e e d

Ga thers vessel movem ent
information and assembles
it into an AIS compliant
data sentence.

Initia tes and controls the
flow of data sentences
between participa ting units

(Source: Ross, 2004)
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Appendix IV
Comparison of AIS- and Radar-based information
Functions
ID and static data

Radar / ARPA
-

Dynamic data
Position
- Absolute
Relative
Accuracy

AIS
•
•
•
•
•
•

AIS Exemple / Comment

MMSI
Call sign and name
IMO number
Length and beam
Type of ship
GNSS antenna
location
With
•
Time stamp
•
Accuracy indication
•
Integrity status

X
Ship: < 30 m
VTS: < 20 m

X
1-5 m
1-5 m

X, if SOG input
X (ambiguous value), if STW
input
-

X
-

Heading replaces CTW

X

From target’s gyro

ROT

-

Nav. status

-

X
10°/min flag
X

CPA /TCPA

X
Distance/bearing-based
-

X
D/GNSS-based
-

-

X
X
X
(x)

Speed
SOG / COG
STW / CTW
Heading

Rudder
Voyage related data
Draught
Cargo
Destination; ETA
Route plan
Targets and symbols
Basic information
More information
Detailed information
Risk
Essentials
Aspect
Ship autonomous
Target display
Manoeuvre detection
Display
Data fusion
Wind, weather

Raw radar
Acquired target (vector)
Selected target data display
Dangerous target
Lost target
(CTW values only)
X
Radar-conspicious target
30 – 90 sec
Radar
With AIS
-

Transmitted if available; or
heading-based
“Underway by engine”; “at
anchor”; “moored”

Intendedly not!

Master’s discretion

Sleeping target
Activated target
(Vector, heading, ROT flag)
Selected target
Dangerous target
Lost target
X
AIS-equipped target
5- 10 sec
Radar; ECDIS; AIS only
With radar
X

Via headings
GNSS dependent
AIS misses very unlikely

Via binary messages

(Source: Berking & Pettersson, 2004)
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Appendix V
Relationship Between IBS and INS
“Integrity
Monitoring”
Consistent common
referencing system

IBS
INS C
Communications;
MI control;
Loading;
Safety & Security;
Management of
Operation

INS B
Autopilot;
Heading &
Track Control

INS A

Chart/ECS/ECDIS;
Radar/ARPA;
AIS;Depth

Heading

Speed

Position

(Source: STN ATLAS, 2004)
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Appendix VI
Lessons to Learn from the Royal Majesty’s Grounding
1. Over-reliance on integrated navigation system led to grounding of cruise vessel
This summary is based on a report issued earlier in the year by the US National
Transportation Safety Board. It is included here with their kind permission.
On the evening of 10 June 1995, the Panamanian registered passenger vessel
ROYAL MAJESTY grounded on Rose and Crown Shoal about 10 miles east of
Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. The vessel, with 1,509 persons on board, was en
route from St Georges, Bermuda, to Boston, Massachusetts.
About an hour after leaving St Georges the Global Positioning System (GPS)
antenna cable became partly disconnected causing the GPS to switch to dead
reckoning mode. Nobody noticed. The autopilot continued to react to the information
derived from the GPS. Thus the set of the vessel, caused by wind, current and sea
conditions, was not detected and allowed for by the system. The fault with the GPS,
and the fact that the vessel was not in the position indicated by the integrated bridge
navigational system, remained unnoticed by the watch officers during the 34 hours
prior to the grounding.
Initial attempts to re-float the vessel were unsuccessful while deteriorating weather
and sea conditions prevented the evacuation of passengers and crew.
On 11 June, ROYAL MAJESTY was re-floated with the aid of five tugs. Initial
damage surveys revealed deformation of the vessel's double bottom. However, no
penetration or cracking of the hull was detected, and no fuel oil had been spilled. The
US Coast Guard gave the vessel permission to proceed to Boston to disembark the
passengers. She arrived there safely on 12 June.
Although there were no injuries as a result of this accident, the costs of repairs to the
vessel and lost revenue were estimated at about US $7 million.
2 The Lessons
This was a well-found vessel with fully qualified and experienced bridge watch
keepers. Like most, if not all, passenger liners the ROYAL MAJESTY was equipped
with modern navigational aids including GPS, which is capable of determining a
vessel's position with great accuracy.
(1) Despite their experience and qualifications the watch keepers remained
unaware of the increasing deviation from the planned track in the 34-hour
period after leaving Bermuda.
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Appendix VII
The principle of UAIS STDMA1
1. The Equipment of AIS

The shipboard and shore station equipment consists of a box containing two (one as a
reserve back up) fully synthesized VHF transmitter and receiver units capable of
operating on any frequency within the marine band (136 -174 MHz). Two VHF
channels within this band have been allocated for intership transponder use by the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) namely AIS1 (161.975Mhz) and
AIS2 (162.025Mhz). If these become overloaded or are allocated to alternative usage
within any area then the system will be switchable to another available channel
within the marine band. The unit also contains a GPS receiver and a computer.

2. Basic Principle of Operation

Each station transmits data in pulses on the VHF frequency and any station within
VHF range will be able to receive the information and display it either on the radar,
ECDIS or a dedicated display. The system can therefore be used for ship to ship and
ship to shore (4S) identification and transfer of data. Using the two channels the
system is designed to provide about 4500 2 slots per minute for transmission of
information "blocks". Depending on the information required a ship will require
more than one slot to transmit the relevant information. There are four types of
information "block".

1

This article is derived from AIS-More Discussion Required? By Baker, J.C. that was published in
Seaways, July 2000.
2

The author mentioned that 4,500 slots per minute appears more than adequate for even the busiest
waterway but the industry’s ambitious plans for it to relay chunks of data about each vessel will eat
into that capacity.
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(1) Static: this will probably consist of Name, Callsign, IMO & MMSI
numbers, Length& Draft. The information will be repeated about
every 6 minutes.
(2) Dynamic 3: GPS Position, Course and Speed made well, Gyro heading
and Rate of Turn. Information is updated every time slot or on
request.
(3) Voyage related: Ship type, Cargo, Destination, ETA etc. Repeated
every 6 minutes or updated as required.
(4) Short Messages: Safety related transmitted as required.

The system will operate in 3 different modes:

(1)

Autonomous and Continuous

When a vessel is at sea it will be operating in this mode and will transmit basic static
and dynamic data, which can be displayed and read by other stations within VHF
range. The transponder monitors other transmissions and transmits when there is a
clear slot between other transmissions.

(2)

Assigned mode

Upon entering a VTS area the transmissions will be automatically controlled by the
shore base station and assigned a slot to link in with other traffic. Ship to shore
transmissions will normally take place on a dedicated port frequency different from
the AIS 1 & 2 intership frequencies. When a ship enters a port area it will be
requested to switch AIS operation to that channel by the polling mode.

(3)

Polled or Controlled mode

The shore station automatically interrogates the other station and requests specific
information and advises the port working frequency to be worked. Operation in this
3

There is currently no requirement for vessels to carry GPS or DGPS. As the Author understands it
the GPS receiver to be incorporated into the AIS unit will be of low grade with the primary function
of controlling the timer of the unit.
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mode may possibly take place on Channel 70 in the form of a DSC short message in
order not to conflict with the other modes.

3. Practical Operation

(1)

Ship to Ship

The system displays the static and dynamic information of other shipping within
VHF range and the advantage of the system is that it will work in heavy clutter and
radar shadow sectors such as behind a headland. Interestingly, opinions of the
serving officers present at the seminar differed as to the merits of positive
identification of shipping. The short sea traders could see distinct advantages in
being able to identify the "Port Hand Charlie" whereas a deep-sea officer was of the
opinion that what was required was not more excuses for VHF conversations but for
shipping to obey the COLREGS. The point was also raised that the existing
COLREGS made no provision for VHF conversations! There was however a general
consensus of opinion that with their identity being beamed out continuously watchkeepers would tend to be more vigilant!

(2)

Ship to Shore

The advantages here are more obvious since AIS will remove the need for vessels to
report to shore stations with their details or to update their position passing reporting
points. VHF conversations will thus be minimized. The promoters of the system
claim that it will to be able to handle around 400 ships. The dynamic information
received is expected to provide sufficient information for a more positive interaction
between a VTS centre and shipping and thus reduce the requirement for compulsory
pilotage. The system could also be used to re-transmit VTS radar positions of vessels
not fitted with AIS to shipping to enable these to be displayed on a vessel's ECDIS or
pilot laptop display4.

4

Currently it is not possible for this VTS information to be received and displayed as vectors, i.e. a
moving vessel will appear as a spot that will jump each time the signal is transmitted.
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General causal factors in the grounding include:
• Over-reliance by watch keeping officers on the automated features of the

integrated bridge system;
• Inadequate training in the technical capabilities and limitations of the

integrated bridge system;
• Poor navigational watch keeping practices in general.

Specific factors include:
• The routing of the GPS antenna cable, which made it vulnerable to damage;
• The fact that the echo sounder alarm had been set to zero depth;
• Deficient monitoring of the status of the GPS;
• No cross-checking of the GPS derived positions by watch keepers;
• Sole reliance on the position-fix alarm for warning of deviation from the

vessel's intended track;
• The configuration of the integrated bridge system, which neither

recognised nor allowed for the fact that the GPS had switched to dead
reckoning mode. Its design did not adequately incorporate human factors
engineering;
• The remoteness of the GPS receiver, and the short duration of the aural

alarm which sounds when switched to the dead reckoning mode,
contributed to the failure of the watch keepers to notice the change.
(2)

MAIB Comment. Modern navigation aids can fail; sometimes without
being noticed by the operator. A fundamental rule of safe navigation is to
always check the primary method of navigation by an independent source.
Radio aids, astro-navigation, visual fixing and use of the echo sounder are
all available to the conscientious navigator. Special care is needed when
making a landfall.
( MAIB, 1997)
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Appendix VIII

AIS Information Display on PC Screen
Ship Is Following The Constant-Radius Turning
Own Ship’s
Info.:
XTE Bargraph
Ship’s Channel
& Channel
Width
L/R Distance
Dist. to next
event
Pos, Course,
Speed
DGPS status
Other Ship’s
Info.:
Vessel Name,
ID
Position
Course
Speed
DGPS status
VHF AIS
status
Dimensions
Closing info.

(Source: Ross, 2004)
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Appendix IX
AIS – Minimum Keyboard Display

(Source: Berking, 2004)
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Appendix X

AIS and Radar Data Association

(Source: SAM 1000, 2004)

Notes:
• An AIS targets will be displayed by switching the AIS button to
“ON”.
• As default the Sleeping Target symbol will be displayed. For
more information, the target has to be activated.
• Sub menus can be selected for additional information.
• Switching AIS button to “OFF”, only activated targets will be
displayed to avoid clutter on the PPI and information overload.
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